Presenter: Nikolaj Niebuhr Lambertsen, AU

Title: On the Optimality of Monotone Market-Based Contracts

Abstract: Optimal contracts are known to be complex and depend on all information that is marginally informative about the agent's action. The efficient market hypothesis suggests that the market price aggregates all information relevant to the firm's value. In an information-rich setting, I derive conditions for when it is optimal to write a contract that only depends on the market price and that is monotonously increasing. The required condition is congruency between when information is ``good news" about the firm's value and when it is ``good news" about the agent's action choice. If the agent is risk neutral, then, under standard, albeit strong, assumptions, the optimal contract is simply a bonus payment based on the market price.

Presenter: Christoph Merkle, AU

Title: Crowd-Sourced Replication Projects

Abstract: In a crowd-sourced collaboration, numerous researchers each carry out specific components of a larger project, usually under the direction of a core coordination team. In this presentation, I will share results and personal experiences from three crowd-sourced replication projects to which I have contributed. The aim is to stimulate discussion about how we do science in view of the replication crisis in the social sciences.

Organizers: Stefan Hirth and Anders Merrild Posselt