

Gender gaps in Salary Negotiations: Salary Requests and Starting Salaries in the Field

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Abstract

This paper provides new descriptive field evidence of gender gaps in negotiation behavior and in subsequent outcomes uniquely evaluated from a large sample of salary negotiations between recent college graduates and their prospective employer occurring at the time of employment. Although females state a salary request to their prospective employer to a slightly larger extent than males do, they ask for lower salaries, and are offered lower starting salaries for the same request. While the gender gaps are small, they are noteworthy considering the homogeneous sample and controls available. Notably, the study highlights the importance of differences in negotiation behavior as accounting for females stating lower salary requests largely reduced or even closed the gender pay gap in subsequent starting salaries.

Keywords: Negotiation Behavior, Salary Requests, Gender Pay Gap
JEL: M51, M52, J31, J16.

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1 Introduction

Despite a large convergence in labor force participation, education, working hours, occupations and hours of household work (Goldin 2014), a large body of literature provides evidence of gender differences in the economic outcomes of males and females, particularly in the labor market. Even when controlling for a broad range of demographic and background characteristics, females earn significantly less than males (Blau and Katz 2016; Booth 2009; Weichselbaumer and Winter-Ebmer 2005), particularly at the top of the salary distribution range (Blau and Katz 2016; Albrecht et al. 2015; Albrecht et al. 2003), and females are under-represented in high-paying jobs and high-level occupations (Bertrand and Hallock 2001).¹

One mechanism suggested to explain these gender gaps, especially those in the labor market, is that males and females are differently inclined towards negotiating or that they behave or are treated differently during negotiations. This mechanism is highlighted in both the economics and social psychology literatures (for overviews in each respective field, see Bertrand 2011; Bowles 2013 or Mazei et al. 2015). Recent evidence in Card, Cardoso and Kline (2016) further document that gender gaps in bargaining power explain 10-15 percent of the gender pay gap, and bargaining power is particularly important in explaining the gender pay gap among the highly educated. Simultaneously, salary negotiations is a crucial part of employer-employee interactions in the labor market, especially at the top of the salary distribution range, and hence poor negotiation behavior or outcomes may result in long term economic consequences. In recent decades, many countries have also shifted toward a more decentralized wage-setting practice, thereby increasing the importance of individual negotiations (Eurofound 2015; Lundborg 2005). Accordingly, understanding the origins and extent of the role of gender in negotiations is vital for policy aiming to reduce gender differences in the labor market.²

In this paper, I assess the role of gender in negotiations using unique data consisting of fourteen Swedish surveys conducted with all recent college graduates in the social sciences between 1999 and 2012 covering around 38,000 individuals. More

¹Sweden is no exception. Albrecht et al. (2015) show that even if the gender log wage gap toward the top of the distribution has decreased, a substantial glass ceiling remains, particularly for white-collar workers in both the private and public sectors. The glass ceiling also applies to younger workers, as more than half of the difference in log wages between males and females was present before the birth of the first child.

²Negotiation behavior could arguably also be claimed to be important in gaining access to better resources or tasks within a workplace, or even for gaining a promotion. It could further be argued that negotiation skills determine broader career choices as these may follow from negotiations within a household on e.g time allocation like parental leave or division of household work.

specifically, I explore a salary negotiation between an applicant (a recent college graduate) and his or her prospective employer for their first job after graduation. These negotiations occurs at the time of employment and concerns the starting salary (the negotiation situation is more described in Section 3).³ In the surveys, this negotiation is captured by respondents being asked to report whether they made an explicit salary request to their prospective employer at the time of employment and, if so, the amount they requested. The respondents were also asked about the salary they were offered at the time of employment, that is, the starting salary. Additionally, the data contain information on characteristics and attitudes of the applicants as well as the attributes of the jobs for which they applied. Consequently, the gender gaps in negotiations are evaluated using large sample field data on salary negotiations that is able to capture several aspects of a negotiation simultaneously: the propensity to have negotiated, the negotiation behavior conditional on negotiating, and the subsequent outcome of the negotiation given the negotiation behavior.

The contribution of the paper is threefold. First, this paper provides descriptive evidence from the field drawn from a large sample. Apart from field data on the propensity to negotiate, field data on salary negotiations have not been much explored. To the best of my knowledge, apart from Säve-Söderbergh (2007), the current study is the first to examine salary requests and to explore how they are associated with negotiation outcomes using field data.⁴ Second, a growing and largely experimental body of literature has documented important gender gaps in negotiation behavior and outcomes (for overviews, see Bertrand 2011; Bowles 2013). However, the gender gaps are assessed in a wide variety of contexts and are based on varying methods and decisions, making it complex to assess how gender matter in negotiations in terms of behavior and outcomes for the same individual. Consequently, this study's second contribution to the literature is the analysis of several aspects of a negotiation in a unified framework. The third contribution is the evaluation of gender gaps across the entire distribution.

The analysis yields a number of interesting findings and shows that gender does play a role in negotiations also in the field, particularly in terms of differences in salary requests but also in the outcomes of a given behavior. Regarding gender gaps in negotiation behavior, a first finding is a reverse, yet small, gender gap in

³While the salary determination in Sweden is typically characterized by a high degree of collective bargaining, starting salaries studied in this paper are exempted from collective agreements (National Mediation Office 2015).

⁴While the present paper in part studies the same questions as those in Säve-Söderbergh (2007) which uses the 1999 and 2000 surveys, the present paper supersedes the latter due to its different scope of analysis given the wider array of variables as well as larger set of data.

the propensity to negotiate salaries at the time of employment. Approximately 45 percent of graduates made a salary request at the time of employment, and female graduates were statistically significantly more likely by 2.5 percentage points to make such requests than male graduates were, controlling for a wide array of job features and applicant characteristics. Moreover, following survey responses regarding the primary reason for not stating a salary request and mean differences in job or applicant characteristics, there was no indication, albeit only descriptive, of a different selection between male or female applicants into stating salary requests or not.

A second finding is a persistent pattern over the years of females stating lower salary requests compared to males among those that negotiated. Once in a negotiation, that is, conditional on having stated a salary request, female applicants request salaries that are approximately 3 percentage points lower (that is, approximately 680 SEK, equivalent to US\$ 85, less in monthly salary) than those requested by similar male applicants applying for a similar job. This gender gap also increases across the salary request distribution and is significantly wider among those with the highest salary requests.

Regarding a gender gap in the negotiation outcome conditional on the negotiation behavior, a third finding is that although the gender gaps are small, female applicants fare worse in the negotiation than male applicants do among those that negotiate, also with controls for many job and applicant characteristics. While the majority of respondents (approximately 65 percent) are offered a starting salary that is lower than their request, the probability of being offered a starting salary that is below the salary request is approximately 2.5 percentage points higher for female applicants than for their male counterparts. Controlling for salary requests, there is also a small gender gap in starting salaries, with female applicants' starting salaries measuring 0.6 percentage points lower than those of male applicants on average.

The gender gaps found are thus small in magnitude, yet they are noteworthy when considering that recent college graduates within five fields of major arguably constitute a homogeneous group and that the sample studied is at an age before typical gender differences in parental leave, experience, or job changes etc. play major roles. Furthermore, the patterns found were robust to accounting for e.g. working hours (parttime and overtime), work sector, industry, recall, job task, experience, sub field within the major, or how the job was found.

Finally, a fourth finding is that the gender gap in negotiation behavior explains a substantial portion of the gender gap in starting salaries among those that negotiated accounting also for other job and applicant characteristics. While female starting

salaries are approximately 3.2 percentage points lower than those of male applicants on average, the gender gap in starting salaries is greatly reduced to 0.6 percentage points when salary requests are controlled for. Gender gaps in salary requests thus explain around 80 percent of the gender gap in starting salaries among those that negotiated. In fact, in the upper end of the distribution, the gender gaps in salary requests explain almost the entire gender gap in starting salaries, suggesting that gender gaps in negotiation behavior play a greater role at the upper end of the pay distribution.

This paper provides new insights from the field while complementing previous literature on gender gaps in negotiations. In particular it provides descriptive field evidence of the presence of gender gaps in negotiation behavior, and these gender gaps are strongly associated with negotiation outcomes. This first evidence is consistent with previous experimental findings in economics (see, e.g., Ridgdon 2015; Dittrich et al. 2014; and Schwierien 2012) and social psychology (Bowles 2013) indicating that females behave more cooperatively in negotiations (if interpreted as requesting less), but this behavior is now demonstrated in the context of salary negotiations in the field. However, in contrast to the previous findings of Babcock and Lashever (2003), Babcock et al. (2006), Hall and Krueger (2012), and Small et al. (2007), the female applicants in this sample negotiated their salaries to a greater extent than the male applicants did, which resemble the findings of no gender gap in the negotiation propensity in Leibbrandt and List (2015) (if wages were explicitly negotiable), Gerhart and Rynes (1991) and Hederos Erikson and Sandberg (2012) (if the negotiation counterpart was male). Apart from related experimental findings in Amanatullah and Tinsley (2013) on female negotiators being socially punished for asserting too much, the result that females were less successful in the negotiation conditional on their negotiation behavior (that is, conditional on their salary requests) has, to the best of my knowledge, not previously been shown using comparable salary negotiations.

The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 summarizes the related literature on gender gaps in salary negotiations. Section 3 presents the data and provides summary statistics. Section 4 presents the results, followed by robustness analysis in Section 5 and a discussion in Section 6. Section 7 offers concluding remarks.

2 Related Literature on Gender Gaps in Salary Negotiations

Studies addressing the question of whether males and females differ in their propensity to negotiate their salaries have provided mixed evidence of a gender gap. Using data from surveys with recent graduates, Babcock and Laschever (2003) and Babcock et al. (2006) find large gender gaps, with males being up to seven times more likely to negotiate a starting salary offer compared with females. Related evidence in Hall and Krueger (2012) further show using survey evidence that females, compared to males, were somewhat less likely to be involved in "some bargaining over the pay" as opposed to a "take-it-or leave-it offer" when offered a new job.⁵ Gerhart and Rynes (1991), however, find no statistical gender gap in the propensity to negotiate salaries using survey data on recent graduates. Experimental research also provides evidence of females being less likely to negotiate relative to males (Bohnet and Bowles 2008; Babcock et al. 2006); however, the findings are sensitive to the gender of the negotiator (Hederos Eriksson and Sandberg 2012) and to framing (Small et al. 2007). Moreover, Exley, Niederle and Vesterlund (2016) provide evidence on this gender gap (as well as the outcome) being sensitive to whether the negotiation is forced or voluntary. In a field experiment advertising a job with and without an explicit statement that the salary is negotiable, Leibbrandt and List (2015) also find a gender gap in initiating a negotiation but only when the salary is not explicitly negotiable.

Summarizing the results of studies addressing the question of whether males and females behave differently in salary negotiations, research commonly shows that females request less in negotiations than males do, although this finding is also sensitive to context and framing. Starting with negotiation behavior in salary negotiations from the field, limited empirical evidence exist. To the best of my knowledge, apart from Säve-Söderbergh (2007), no previous study has evaluated salary requests using field data. Recent experimental research, however, provides evidence on gender gaps in salary negotiation behavior. Using a version of the ultimatum game, Rigdon (2015) finds that females request significantly less than males do but not if the subjects are given information regarding others' requests. In a

⁵Related research also suggests that females are less willing to compete or that they perform worse in competitions than males do, and as a result, they tend to choose less high-paying educational tracks or occupations (Buser et al. 2014). Flory, Leibbrandt and List (2015) further show that neither males nor females preferred to be in competitive work environments, yet females show an even lower preference than males. Manning and Saidi (2010), however, find a small gender gap, with females being less likely to work under performance contracts compared to males.

“double auction with effort” framework, Schwieren (2012) finds no gender gap in initial requests, whereas in subsequent periods, females had adjusted their requests downward (although this gap was only marginally significant). Social psychology experiments (for an overview, see Bowles 2013) also find that females request lower salaries. The gender gap however disappears with different framing (Kray et al. 2001) or with controls for the reservation salary (Tellhed and Björklund, 2010) or for attitudes on “oriented toward requesting more” or “oriented toward requesting the same” (Barron 2003).⁶

Results on a gender gap in negotiation outcomes are mixed. Research specifically addressing salary negotiations typically finds that females gain less from negotiations than males do. Using survey data, Babcock and Laschever (2003) and Gerhart and Rynes (1991) find that males earn more from initiating negotiations than females do. The experimental research on salary negotiations mentioned above, however, provides mixed results; Schwieren (2012) and Rigdon (2015) report that females earn less or are offered significantly lower amounts compared with males, but in the latter study, this gap disappeared when subjects received information regarding others’ requests. Males also achieved more favorable outcomes in the work of Dittrich et al. (2014) using an experiment exploring face-to-face alternating offers, but the gap varied according to the gender of the counterpart and whether subjects played the role of employer or employee. Finally, following wage decompositions of longitudinal employer-employee matched wage data, Card, Cardoso and Kline (2016) provide evidence of gender differentials in bargaining power, as females receive smaller fractions of firm-wide rents compared with males, explaining approximately 10-15 percent of the gender wage gap. Notably, gender differentials in bargaining power were most significant among individuals with higher education.⁷

⁶Experimental evidence in the economics literature similarly shows that females also negotiate more cooperatively than males do in negotiations that are not set in a salary context (see, e.g., Eckel and Grossman 2008) and that the gender gap is sensitive to context (Sutter et al. 2009) and gender pairing (see, e.g., Holm 2000).

⁷The results of studies not set in a salary negotiation context also document gender gaps in negotiation outcomes. In a field experiment involving bargaining for a new car, females achieved poorer outcomes compared with males, even when identical scripted bargaining strategies were used (Ayres and Siegelman, 1995). Castillo et al. (2013), by contrast, report that females obtain better bargaining outcomes than males do when offered better prices and that they are rejected less frequently when using a specific bargaining strategy. Finally, in comparing male and female sellers raised in matrilineal and patriarchal societies, Andersen et al. (2013) find that female sellers attain better outcomes compared with male sellers in the matrilineal society, both in the lab and in the field. In the patriarchal society, however, the pattern in the lab was reversed. Finally, in a meta-analysis on experimental social psychology studies on gender differences in negotiation outcomes, Mazei et al. (2015) find gender gaps in the negotiation outcomes, yet these gaps were context dependent and were reduced with negotiation experience, with information on the bargaining range and when negotiating on behalf of someone else.

3 Data and Summary Statistics

This paper uses data from fourteen annual surveys from 1999 to 2012 with all recent college graduates in Sweden. The surveys are conducted by *Jusek*⁸, a Swedish trade union for white-collar workers and are distributed within one to one and a half year after graduation to all (that is, not only to members) graduates. To be included in the survey the graduates needed to have at least three years of university education and a major in one of five fields—law, business administration and economics, computer and systems science, personnel management or social science—for each specific survey year. Only individuals who fulfilled the above requirements and were born after 1964 were included in the survey sample. The response rate reported by *Jusek* averages approximately 49.5 percent for the years studied, out of a total of approximately 5,700 graduates each year.⁹

The total data for 1999-2012 contain 38,347 observations, of which 1,905 are excluded because of missing data. Of the total, 29,263 respondents were working, while 7,179 respondents were not working either because of postgraduate studies, the inability to find a relevant job, parental leave or other factors. In the working and non-working sample, approximately 63 percent are female, and 37 percent are male respondents. Consequently, there is a predominance of women in the sample. This reflects the fact that females constitute a larger share of university students in Sweden and a larger share of graduates relative to males (Statistics Sweden, 2014). Moreover, females constitute a majority within the majors studied here, apart from computer and system science (Statistics Sweden, 2014), for more specifics see Appendix Figures 1 and 2.¹⁰

⁸The Swedish Association of Graduates in Law, Business Administration and Economics, Computer and Systems Science, Personnel Management and Social Sciences.

⁹The specific response rates and sample sizes for each year are: 35% out of 8,003 in 2012, 37% out of 7,179 in 2011, 38% out of 7,680 in 2010, 37% out of 7,179 in 2009, 40% out of 5,026 in 2008, 52% out of 5,615 in 2007, 54% out of 5,639 in 2006, 54% out of 5,114 in 2005, 53% out of 5,420 in 2004, 54% out of 5,639 in 2003, 54% out of 4,500 in 2002, 59% out of 4,500 in 2001, 63% out of 4,500 in 2000, 63% out of 4,000 in 1999.

¹⁰One concern could be that the predominance of females in the sample is due to a gender bias in response rates. Appendix Figure 1 displays the yearly share of females among the graduates within each field of major for each year between 1999 and 2012, derived from Statistics Sweden, while Appendix Figure 2 displays the same female share based on the survey data. Comparing mean shares derived from the two sources it is found that the yearly female shares of respondents with majors in law, business administration and social science correspond well to those given by Statistics Sweden over the period studied. Of the majors in computer science, females are overrepresented in the survey years 2001-2006. However, this also reflects a difference in the definition of the degree of computer science between the survey and Statistic Sweden. For majors in personnel management, Statistics Sweden provides no comparable figures.

3.1 The Salary Negotiation

The specific survey questions used for evaluating negotiation behavior and negotiation outcomes are:

(i) *“Did you state a salary request at the time of employment? Provide the salary request before taxes. If it applies to part-time work, convert to the full-time equivalent.”* with the reply options: “ Yes, No” and “If yes,..... SEK per month”

(ii) *“What was the gross salary that you received at the time of employment? Provide the salary before taxes. If you worked part time, convert to the full-time equivalent.”*

As stated in the questions, the stating of salary requests and starting salaries refer to a salary determination process occurring at the time of employment (not at the application stage) between the applicant and the employer with whom they started to work. The data thus covers accepted employee-employer matches.

This salary determination process is referred to as a salary negotiation by *Jusek*, see e.g. <https://www.jusek.se/Lon/Loneforhandling/nyttjobb/>.¹¹ While there is no formal statistics on the frequency of these salary negotiations, neither for the labor market in general, nor for the sub group studied here (apart from the frequencies provided in this paper), descriptive evidence based on information provide on the website of *Jusek* (<http://www.jusek.se>), one of the thirty most commonly occurring issues during a recruitment process for a new job regards the salary request (see e.g. http://www.jusek.se/Karriar/anstallningsintervjun/Infor_intervjun). The advice of the trade union is therefore for the applicant to have a salary request in mind to the first interview, in case the question is asked. However, they also suggest that the applicant postpone stating a request until late in the employment process. Simultaneously, they also encourage everyone to state a salary request as opposed to not. The advice is in general directed towards all applicants and devotes much effort to impel applicants to negotiate over their starting salaries at the time of employment. The advice is neither directed towards certain applicants nor to applicants applying for particular jobs. Analogous information is provided by other Swedish trade unions covering recent graduates in

¹¹There has been a large shift towards a more decentralised wage-setting practice over the last few decades in Sweden (see Granqvist and Regnér 2008; National Mediation Office 2015). Local wage agreements are common, especially among white-collar workers. Furthermore, on the basis of the applicable wage agreements covering the professions within the majors considered in this paper, the agreements have stipulated local wage setting over the whole period of study, implying that employers are free to determine the starting salary (National Mediation Office 2015).

e.g. engineering (see <http://www.sverigesingenjorer.se/Loner-avtal-lagar/din-lon/ingangslon/>), or on job searching sites (see e.g. <https://cruited.com/>). In addition, similar information is provided by career advisors in the UK (see e.g. <https://targetjobs.co.uk/careers-advice/acceptance-and-rejection/275663-negotiating-a-better-package-for-your-new-job>) or the US (see e.g. <https://www.livecareer.com/quintessential/salary-negotiation-mistakes>).

3.2 Summary statistics for the propensity to state a salary request




Figure 1: The Mean Share of Male and Female Respondents that Stated a Salary Request, separated by Year and Gender

Beginning with the summary statistics for the propensity to state a salary request, Figure 1 illustrates the mean shares of working respondents who stated a salary request at the time of employment (i.e., replied "Yes") or did not state a salary request (i.e., replied "No") divided by gender and year. Two interesting patterns emerge in the figure. First, stating a salary request is not uncommon among

the applicants, as approximately an average of 45 % of the respondents replied that they had stated a salary request, whereas 55 % replied that they had not. Second, over the whole period are male and female respondents similarly likely, or females are slightly more likely, to have stated a salary request; on average 46 % of the female subjects compared with 44 % of the male subjects report having stated a salary request between 1999 and 2012, thus suggesting a reversed gender gap in the propensity to stated a salary request. The time pattern of a declining rate in the probability to state a salary request is also similar across gender.

3.3 Summary statistics for the salary requests

Table 1: Summary Statistics of the Salary Negotiation Variables

	1999-2012		1999-2010		1999-2008	
	Male (1)	Female (2)	Male (3)	Female (4)	Male (5)	Female (6)
Salary Request	23 128.6*** (4 822.7)	22 173.3 (3 961.3)	22 600.0*** (4 451.7)	21 684.0 (3 710.0)	21 982.1*** (4 239.5)	21 080.7 (3 502.0)
Starting Salary (Yes Salary Request)	22 180.8*** (4 761.2)	21 206.5 (3 926.5)	21 705.1*** (4 605.3)	20 744.4 (3 729.3)	21 003.9*** (4 152.5)	20 070.9 (3 401.8)
<i>Observations</i>	4 807	8 587	4 156	7 301	3 435	5 879
Starting Salary (No Salary Request)	21 153.7*** (5 440.0)	20 069.3 (3 986.6)	20 456.8*** (5 065.1)	19 442.9 (3 748.8)	19 717.1*** (4 694.2)	18 773.9 (3 428.3)
<i>Observations</i>	6 041	10 003	4 926	8 126	3 923	6 325
<i>Less</i> (Salary Request > Salary Offer)	0.56***	0.60	0.57***	0.61	0.58***	0.63
<i>Same</i> (Salary Request = Salary Offer)	0.32***	0.29	0.30***	0.29	0.31***	0.28
<i>More</i> (Salary Request < Salary Offer)	0.12***	0.11	0.12***	0.10	0.11***	0.09
If <i>Less</i> =1	-2 044.0*** (1 813.0)	-1 879.5 (1 537.4)	1 973.7*** (1 734.2)	1 836.6 (1 494.0)	1 969.5*** (1 731.9)	1 844.4 (1 534.8)
If <i>More</i> =1	1 605.3*** (1 654.8)	1 419.4 (1 487.4)	1 413.2** (1 213.2)	1 265.6 (1 083.8)	1 582.2** (1 670.1)	1 395.5 (1 558.2)
<i>Observations</i>	4 748	8 425	4 138	7 243	3 382	5 834

Note: * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$ in a *t-test* of a gender difference in mean values within each sample (column 1-2, column 3-4, column 5-6). *Less*, *Same* and *More* contain those with a starting salary that was smaller, equal or larger than their salary request, respectively.
Source: *Jusek* surveys, 1999-2012.

Table 1 reports the summary statistics for the monthly salary requests and starting salaries divided according to gender. The mean values in Table 1 indicate that the female applicants state lower mean salary requests compared with the male applicants. The unconditional mean gender gap in salary requests amounts to approximately 955 SEK (approximately US\$119), or 4.1 % (see columns 1 and 2) for the 1999-2012 period. The unconditional gender gap in salary requests is also prevalent in all individual years and are statistically significant at the 1 percent level in each year.

The distributions of salary requests also differ by gender. As illustrated by Figure 2 displaying box plots of the salary requests divided by gender and year, the yearly female median values are lower and the distributions show a lower variance; the salary request distribution is thus more compressed among females compared to

males. The female distribution is also more skewed to the right compared with the male distribution see Appendix Figures 3 and 4 (Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests for the equality of each distribution function are also rejected at $p < 0.001$).




Figure 2: Box Plots of the Salary Request, separated by Year and Gender

3.4 Summary statistics for the negotiation outcome

Two measures are used for the negotiation outcome among those that stated a salary request. The first measure is the starting salary that the applicant obtained at the time of employment. This is measured both among those that stated a salary request and those who did not (but not among those not working). The second measure is the proportion among each gender that obtained a starting salary that was either above (named *Less*), equal to (named *Same*) or below (named *More*) the applicant's salary request.

Following the summary statistics for the starting salaries presented in Table 1, the unconditional gender gap in starting salaries is approximately 4.4 %, or 974 SEK (approximately US\$122) (see columns 1 and 2) on the basis of a mean starting salary being approximately 21,600 SEK among those that stated a salary request

for the 1999-2012 period. For comparison, the unconditional gender gap in starting salaries among those not stating requests is somewhat higher at 5.1 %, or approximately 1,084 SEK (approximately US\$136) (see columns 1 and 2) based on the mean starting salary being 20,500 SEK in this group.




Figure 3: The Mean share of the Negotiation Outcomes *Less*, *More* and *Same*, separated by Year and Gender

Among those who stated a salary request, Figure 3 (and Table 1) shows that a majority of male and female applicants are offered salaries that are lower than their requested salaries (*Less*). This share is slightly larger among the female applicants, and has a mean of 60 % of the female applicants compared with 56 % of the male applicants over the whole period. The bulk of the remaining group among both genders obtains their requested salary as starting salary (*Same*). A small group of approximately 11 % have also obtained starting salaries that were above the salary request (*More*). This pattern is similar across the different survey years. Table 1 also provides the mean difference between the starting salary and the salary request, divided by the three groups. Compared to females, the male applicants have a higher mean difference if in the group *Less* but they also have a higher mean among those

in the group *More*.¹²

In addition to the questions on the salary negotiation, the surveys include questions on the characteristics and attitudes of the applicant as well as features of the job. For all surveys (1999-2012), these include the applicants' field of major (law, business administration and economics, computer and systems science, personnel management or social science), age (20-25, 25-30, 31+), job sector (private, governmental or municipal) and temporary (trial-period employment, project-based work or substitute contracts) versus permanent employment contracts. In the 1999-2010 surveys, a question for part-time employment (fewer than 40 hours per week) is also available. Furthermore, the 1999-2010 surveys contain a question on how the applicant found the job, either through an advertisement (newspaper, internet or other journal) or by contacting the employer, receiving a job offer by the employer, finding the job through networks or an agency (recruitment or employment agency), or "other" means. As a proxy for labor market conditions, I derive also the yearly share of unemployed graduates within a field of major by using the share of survey responses from non-working respondents who reported that the reason for not working is "I have not found a relevant job" available in the 1999-2010 period. Finally, information on 18 industries is available in the 1999-2008 surveys. Additional analyses are provided in the robustness section using information on working hours, experience, job task, sub-field of major, recall, university and job qualifications.

3.5 Summary statistics for the applicant and job characteristics

Table 2 displays the summary statistics for the control variables by gender and by the year in which the survey contained the information. The summary statistics are also divided according to whether the respondent is working or not and, in the former group, whether the respondent had stated a salary request or not.

Broadly speaking, applicants consists of around 40 % majors in business administration and economics, 20 % majors in law and around similar shares of approximately 14 % majors in social science and personnel management, while around 12 % in computer and systems science. The majority of applicants are between 26-30 years of age. The bulk of applicants apply for a private sector job, a full-time employment and a permanent position.

¹²Table 1 also displays summary statistics for the 1999-2010 and 1999-2008 samples; see columns 3-4 and columns 5-6, respectively. As displayed in the table, the mean gender gaps in these samples are similar to those found in the 1999-2012 samples.

Table 2: Summary Statistics of Control Variables

	Working/Negotiated		Working/Not Negotiated		Not Working	
	Male (1)	Female (2)	Male (3)	Female (4)	Male (5)	Female (6)
<i>Salary Variables</i>						
Starting Salary (1999-2012)	22 135.4***	21 138.6	21 034.9*** ^a	19 908.7 ^a		
Observations	4 738	8 403	6 234	10 272		
<i>Field of Major</i>						
Law	0.13**	0.14	0.23* ^a	0.25 ^a	0.10	0.12
M.B.A/Economics	0.45***	0.37	0.45*** ^a	0.35	0.41	0.29
Computer and System Science	0.19***	0.08	0.12*** ^a	0.05 ^a	0.12	0.05
Personnel Management	0.08***	0.19	0.05*** ^a	0.15 ^a	0.09	0.19
Social Science	0.16***	0.22	0.15*** ^a	0.20 ^c	0.28	0.34
<i>Age (1999-2012)</i>						
Age 20-25	0.14**	0.18	0.14***	0.19	0.18	0.21
Age 26-30	0.65**	0.63	0.68*** ^a	0.64	0.57	0.53
Age 30+	0.21**	0.19	0.18* ^a	0.17 ^a	0.25	0.26
<i>Not Working (1999-2012)</i>						
Parental Leave					0.02***	0.13
Studies					0.46***	0.39
Not found relevant job					0.38	0.35
Other					0.14	0.13
<i>Work Sector (1999-2012)</i>						
Private Sector	0.69***	0.58	0.64*** ^a	0.56 ^a		
Governmental Sector	0.20***	0.24	0.31*** ^a	0.34 ^a		
Municipal Sector	0.10***	0.17	0.05*** ^a	0.11 ^a		
Observations	4 817	8 607	6 049	10 022	2 578	4 621
<i>How the Job was Found (1999-2010)</i>						
Ad	0.39	0.39	0.36 ^a	0.37 ^a		
Got Offer	0.10***	0.12	0.14 ^a	0.13 ^b		
Contacted Self	0.13*	0.12	0.10 ^a	0.12		
Network	0.21***	0.17	0.20***	0.18		
Agency	0.12***	0.15	0.08*** ^a	0.10 ^a		
Other	0.05***	0.05	0.12*** ^a	0.11 ^a		
<i>Work Hours per Week (1999-2010)</i>						
Part time	0.28***	0.37	0.29***	0.37		
Observations	4 156	7 308	4 929	8 130		
<i>Industry</i>						
Bank/Finance/Insurance Company	0.13***	0.10	0.12* ^c	0.11		
Auditing	0.04**	0.04	0.07* ^a	0.06 ^a		
Law Firm	0.02	0.02	0.04* ^a	0.03 ^a		
IT Firm	0.20***	0.10	0.13*** ^a	0.07 ^a		
Media	0.04	0.05	0.04*	0.04 ^a		
Recruitment	0.03***	0.05	0.02*** ^b	0.04 ^a		
Sales and Service	0.10**	0.11	0.10*	0.11		
Manufacturing	0.08***	0.06	0.07* ^b	0.06		
International Organization	0.0003**	0.002	0.0002* ^b	0.005 ^a		
Union	0.02***	0.03	0.01*** ^a	0.02 ^a		
Public Administration	0.15***	0.18	0.11*** ^a	0.13 ^a		
University	0.03**	0.04	0.06* ^a	0.05 ^a		
Justice System	0.02	0.02	0.15* ^a	0.16 ^a		
State Enterprise	0.02***	0.03	0.02**	0.03 ^a		
Municipal Administration	0.06***	0.12	0.03*** ^a	0.07 ^a		
Municipal Enterprise	0.02	0.02	0.01* ^a	0.01 ^a		
County Council	0.01	0.01	0.005* ^a	0.01 ^a		
Other	0.02**	0.02	0.02* ^b	0.01 ^a		
Observations	3 434	5 871	3 921	6 310		

Note: * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$ in a t -test of a gender difference in mean values within each sample "Working/Negotiated", "Working/Not Negotiated" and "Not Working" (column 1-2, column 3-4, and column 5-6).

^a $p < 0.01$, ^b $p < 0.05$, ^c $p < 0.10$ in a t -test of a within-gender difference in mean values between the samples "Working/Negotiated" and "Working/Not Negotiated" (column 1-3, column 2-4).

Source: Jusek surveys, 1999-2012.

In comparing mean values among those working, it is found that those who state salary requests have statistically significantly higher starting salaries and are statistically significantly more likely to have majored in computer and systems science and less likely to have majored in law. They are also more likely to be older, have applied for a job in the municipal sector or in an IT firm, while less likely to have applied for a job in the governmental sector or in the justice system. Comparing the working and non-working respondents, the latter group is statistically significantly more likely to be below 25 or above 30 years of age and contains a larger share of social science majors.

One concern is that selection patterns between working and non-working graduates, or between those stating a salary request and those who did not, are different by gender. Based on a simple mean value comparison (*t-tests*), however, there is no indication of males and female graduates' selection patterns into working or not, or into stating salary requests or not, being different. Conditional on working, mean value differences between those stating a salary request and those who do not are similar with respect to major, age, work sector, work contract, job-seeking strategy and working hours within each gender (for males, see columns 1 and 3; for females, see columns 2 and 4). Conditional on not working, the selection patterns among females and males are also similar with respect to major and age (see columns 5 and 6) while females are less likely to enroll in postgraduate studies and are more likely to be on parental leave (see columns 5 and 6).

4 Results

4.1 Gender Gaps in Negotiation Behavior

To evaluate if there are gender gaps in the negotiation behavior, I below examine first if there is a gender gap in the propensity to have stated a salary request at the time of employment using the full sample of working respondents. Second, to examine if males and females applicants behave differently in a negotiation, gender gaps in salary requests are evaluated among those who stated a salary request.

4.1.1 Gender gaps in propensity to state salary requests

Beginning with estimating whether there is a gender gap in the propensity to state a salary request while also controlling for observables, Table 3 presents estimates of probit regression models of the probability of having stated a salary request, which is

separated by the survey samples according to the different sets of control variables. The full results are reported Table A1 of the Appendix.

Table 3: Probit regression estimates of the probability to state a salary request

	1999-2012		1999-2010			1999-2008		
	Probit Negotiate	Probit Negotiate	Probit Negotiate	Probit Negotiate	Probit Negotiate	Probit Negotiate	Probit Negotiate	Probit Negotiate
bargain								
Female	0.049 (0.015)***	0.058 (0.016)***	0.039 (0.017)**	0.057 (0.017)***	0.057 (0.018)***	0.037 (0.019)**	0.077 (0.020)***	0.071 (0.020)***
Constant	-0.144 (0.012)***	69.762 (3.768)***	-0.107 (0.013)***	71.795 (4.837)***	46.043 (5.225)***	-0.083 (0.015)***	43.588 (7.354)***	47.585 (7.645)***
Controls99-10	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Industry dummies	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes
Obs.	29182	29182	24352	24352	24352	19526	19526	19526
Ps. R-square	0.000	0.033	0.000	0.035	0.049	0.000	0.055	0.093

Standard errors in parentheses

Note: For a full report of all estimates, see Appendix C

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Also with controls for observables, there is a reversed gender gap in the probability of having stated a salary request implying that on average females are more likely to have stated a salary request compared to males. This finding is robust to adding controls for how the applicant found the job, labor market conditions as measured by the yearly share of unemployed graduates within the same field of major, the job being part time (columns 5 and 7) and industry (column 8).¹³ In sum, when accounting for the largest set of controls (as in column 8) and estimating marginal effects, female applicants are approximately 2.6 percentage points more likely to state a salary request compared with male applicants, all else equal. The job and applicant characteristics that matter most for the reversed gender gap are field of major (in particular, applicants with a major in personnel are more likely to state requests, a major that is strongly female-dominated), sector of work and industry. Variables of little importance for the gender gap are if they applied for a temporary or part-time job, how the job was found, and unemployment level.¹⁴

From the above, however, we cannot evaluate why some applicants stated a salary request while some did not, and whether that differed by gender. To conduct such an evaluation, the question “*If you did not state a salary request, what was the primary reason?*” included in the 2002, 2004 and 2005 surveys provides some descriptive evidence. Table 4 reports the distribution of answers for each response

¹³The results are robust to employing an OLS regression model.

¹⁴Performing regressions adding each explanatory variable separately show that the probability of stating a salary request is mostly explained by differences in the applicants’ field of major and within which industry the job is in. Based on the pseudo r-squared, around 2.5 percent of the variation in the probability of stating a salary request is explained by field of major and 3.8 percent by industry. How the job was found is also of some importance and explains one percent of the variation. Remaining variables have lower explanatory powers. These results are available upon request.

option by gender and by year for a total of 3,458 respondents.

Table 4: The Distribution of Answers to the Survey Question:
"If You Did Not State a Salary Request, What was the Primary Reason?"

	2002		2003		2005	
	Male (1)	Female (2)	Male (3)	Female (4)	Male (5)	Female (6)
<i>Response Alternatives</i>						
"Content with the salary offer"	0.29	0.24	0.20	0.19	0.19	0.14
"The salary did not matter"	0.13	0.12	0.09	0.06	0.11	0.05
"Afraid I would not get the job"	0.08	0.08	0.06	0.04	0.03	0.05
"Did not know what level to request"	0.04	0.07				
"Did not know when or how to negotiate"	0.02	0.04				
"Impression of a fixed salary"			0.51	0.56	0.37	0.41
"The salary was not discussed"			0.08	0.09	0.09	0.12
"Did not know how or what to request"			0.01	0.03	0.02	0.03
"Did not dare"			0	0.001	0.005	0.003
"Other"	0.44	0.46	0.05	0.029	0.185	0.197
<i>Observations</i>	423	703	450	765	425	692

Source: Jusek surveys 2002, 2004 and 2005.

A large bulk of the respondents among both male and female applicants reply that the primary reason for not having stated a salary request was that they were *"under the impression that the salary was fixed,"* including 51 percent and 56 percent of the male and female applicants in 2004 and 37 percent and 41 percent in 2005, respectively. In the same years, almost 10 percent of both genders reply correspondingly that the *"salary was never discussed."* In 2002, these response options were not included; instead, the most common reply is found in the "other" category, including 44 percent of the male and 46 percent of the female applicants. For all survey years, the second and third most common replies combined pertain to applicants' valuation of the salary offered; approximately one-third to one-fifth of each sample either reported being *"content with the offer"* or indicated that *"the salary did not matter."* Few respondents (below 8 percent) of either gender replied that the primary reason for not stating a salary request was that they were "afraid I would not get the job." Finally, very few respondents reported a lack of knowledge (*"not knowing how"* or *"what level to submit"*), and below 0.5 percent reported fear (*"did not dare"*) as their primary reason for not stating a salary request. The survey responses thus suggest that the main reasons for not negotiating were primarily based on applicants' perception that the salary was fixed or non-negotiable or their feeling that they were content or did not care about the salary. Neither of these answers differed significantly by gender, nor did psychological motivations based on fear. Consequently, the above provides no descriptive evidence of a particular gender difference in the selection pattern to state salary requests within the sample studied.

4.1.2 Gender gaps in salary requests

Having shown that there is no bias by gender in the selection of applicants to stating salary request, this section proceeds with examining whether males and females behaved differently during the negotiation by estimating standard Mincer wage regression models for the log monthly salary requests among those that negotiated. The results are reported in Table 5, Panel A, with the full results reported in Table A2 of the Appendix. To adjust for heteroskedasticity, robust standard errors as well as a linear time trend are employed in all models.¹⁵

Conditional on having stated a salary request, the estimates in Table 5, Panel A, show that with controls for various job and applicant attributes, female applicants request between 2.6 % and 3.1 % lower salaries compared with male applicants. Although controlling for differences between male and female applicants in their major, age, job sector and whether the job was permanent or not reduces the gender gap in salary requests, the gap remains statistically significant in the results for the 1999-2012 sample (columns 1 and 2). The gender gap is also robust to accounting for the job being part time, how the applicant found the job and differences in labor market conditions (columns 4 and 5). Adding controls for industry (available in the 1999-2008 sample) does not essentially change the result, as industry explains a small share of the gender gap (columns 7 and 8).

4.2 Gender Gaps in Negotiation Outcomes for a given Negotiation Behavior

4.2.1 Gender gaps in starting salaries conditional on the salary request

To evaluate whether gender plays a role in the negotiation outcome for a given negotiation behavior, Panels B and C in Table 5 display eight models that are equivalent to those in Panel A, first for the starting salary (Panel B) and second for the starting salary conditional on the salary request (Panel C). The full results are reported in Tables A3 and A4 in the Appendix. Not accounting for any gender difference in negotiation behavior, the results reveal a gender gap of approximately 2.9-3.4 % in starting salaries (see Panel B, columns 5, 7 and 8), which is a slightly larger gap than that for the salary requests using the same set of controls.¹⁶

¹⁵All results are robust to using year dummies.

¹⁶For comparison with the group that did not state a salary request, Table A19 in the Appendix provides the equivalent starting salary estimates for the group that *did not state* salary requests. We observe two differences between the samples: (i) the gender gap in starting salaries is slightly larger among those that did not state requests also when comparing estimations using the same

Table 5: OLS Regression Results for the Salary Request, Starting Salary and the Starting Salaries Conditional on the Salary Request

Panel A: Salary Requests								
	1999-2012		1999-2010			1999-2008		
	log Salary Request (1)	log Salary Request (2)	log Salary Request (3)	log Salary Request (4)	log Salary Request (5)	log Salary Request (6)	log Salary Request (7)	log Salary Request (8)
Female	-0.038 (0.004)***	-0.035 (0.005)***	-0.037 (0.005)***	-0.034 (0.006)***	-0.031 (0.005)***	-0.037 (0.003)***	-0.027 (0.004)***	-0.026 (0.005)***
Constant	10.029 (0.009)***	-43.507 (0.858)***	10.009 (0.008)***	-48.279 (0.701)***	-47.444 (0.738)***	9.981 (0.006)***	-49.514 (0.765)***	-50.579 (1.115)***
Controls99-12	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Controls99-10	No	No	No	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Industry dummies	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes
Observations	13394	13394	11457	11457	11457	9314	9314	9314
R-square	0.010	0.387	0.010	0.368	0.380	0.011	0.345	0.360
Adj. R-Square	0.010	0.387	0.010	0.367	0.379	0.011	0.343	0.357

Panel B: Starting Salaries								
	1999-2012		1999-2010			1999-2008		
	log Starting Salary (1)	log Starting Salary (2)	log Starting Salary (3)	log Starting Salary (4)	log Starting Salary (5)	log Starting Salary (6)	log Starting Salary (7)	log Starting Salary (8)
Female	-0.040 (0.005)***	-0.038 (0.006)***	-0.041 (0.006)***	-0.037 (0.007)***	-0.034 (0.007)***	-0.041 (0.003)***	-0.030 (0.005)***	-0.029 (0.005)***
Constant	9.987 (0.009)***	-44.873 (0.874)***	9.966 (0.008)***	-49.482 (1.201)***	-50.844 (0.646)***	9.935 (0.006)***	-50.109 (1.037)***	-51.217 (1.420)***
Controls99-12	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Controls99-10	No	No	No	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Industry dummies	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes
Observations	13394	13394	11457	11457	11457	9314	9314	9314
R-square	0.011	0.382	0.012	0.360	0.372	0.014	0.318	0.337
Adj. R-Square	0.011	0.382	0.012	0.360	0.371	0.014	0.317	0.334

Panel C: Starting Salaries Conditional on Salary Requests								
	1999-2012		1999-2010			1999-2008		
	log Starting Salary (1)	log Starting Salary (2)	log Starting Salary (3)	log Starting Salary (4)	log Starting Salary (5)	log Starting Salary (6)	log Starting Salary (7)	log Starting Salary (8)
Female	-0.005 (0.002)**	-0.007 (0.002)**	-0.006 (0.002)**	-0.007 (0.002)**	-0.006 (0.002)**	-0.008 (0.002)***	-0.006 (0.002)**	-0.006 (0.002)*
log Sal. Request	0.935 (0.011)***	0.881 (0.019)***	0.933 (0.012)***	0.884 (0.016)***	0.884 (0.016)***	0.907 (0.013)***	0.878 (0.017)***	0.873 (0.016)***
Constant	0.606 (0.114)***	-6.549 (0.669)***	0.628 (0.124)***	-6.814 (0.682)***	-8.880 (0.449)***	0.880 (0.129)***	-6.652 (0.396)***	-7.057 (0.581)***
Controls99-12	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Controls99-10	No	No	No	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Industry dummies	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes
Observations	13394	13394	11457	11457	11457	9314	9314	9314
R-square	0.824	0.829	0.819	0.823	0.826	0.801	0.806	0.809
Adj. R-Square	0.824	0.829	0.819	0.823	0.826	0.801	0.806	0.808

Robust standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Note: Controls 99-12 contain major, age, work sector, temporary job contract, and a linear time trend.

Controls 99-10 contain part-time work, how the job was found and the yearly share

of unemployed per major. Industry dummies refers to 18 industry dummies available in the 1999-2008 sample.

For a full report of all estimates, see Tables A2-A4 in the Appendix.

Source: Jusek surveys, 1999-2012.

However, when also controlling for females requesting lower salaries (along with the job and applicant characteristics) it is found that the magnitude of the gender gap in starting salaries is greatly reduced to approximately 0.6 percent (see Panel C, columns 5, 7 and 8), implying a small mean gender gap in the monthly salaries of 133 SEK (approximately US\$16) based on the mean male starting salary of 22,181 SEK (US\$2,767) in column 1 of Table 1 for the 1999-2012 period. However, doing an “asking advantage” example similar to that used by Babcock and Laschever (2003, p.5) to quantify the loss that female applicants experience in monetary terms over a 38-year career, the loss for a female applicant would amount to 210,316 SEK (US \$30,645).¹⁷

Notably, Panel C also shows how accounting for differences in negotiation behavior in terms of salary requests, along with controls for several typical applicant and job features, reduced the unexplained gender gap in starting salaries by approximately 80 percent, leaving 20 percent of the gender gap unexplained conditional on having negotiated.¹⁸

4.2.2 Gender gaps in probability of attaining a starting salary below, equal to or above the salary request

Another measure of a gender gap in negotiation outcomes that is conditional on the negotiation behavior, is the extent to which male and female applicants are equally likely to be successful in the negotiation by achieving a starting salary that is either below, equal or above their requested salary. Table 6 reports the estimates of three

controls for both groups and (ii) the control variables explain more of the variation in starting salaries among those that stated requests, compared to those who did not (see e.g. adjusted r-squared is 0.37 in Table 5 Panel B, column 5, while the equivalent is 0.32 among those that did not state a request, see Table A19, column 5).

¹⁷Suppose that one male and one female applicant, both of whom are 22 years old and equally qualified, request the same monthly salary. Assume that the male applicant attains a monthly salary of 25,000 SEK. According to the estimates in Table 5, Panel C, which account for gender differences in terms of, for example, major, part-time work, job sector and industry, the female applicants’ starting salary would be 0.6 percentage point lower (thus, 24,850 SEK) or equivalently to a yearly income gap of 1,800 SEK. Assume that they receive identical 3 percent raises every year throughout their career; by the time they reach age 60, their accumulated salary gap will have widened to 210,316 SEK.

¹⁸To explore if there is a heterogeneous association by gender in salary requests and starting salaries, the above model has been estimated including also an interaction term between being female and the salary requests. The results are reported in Table A20 in the Appendix C. Results are mixed. Using the full sample, or the sample through 2010, the interaction term for salary request and female gender is negative but not statistically significant. However, based on the reduced sample of 1999-2008 containing the largest set of controls, the estimates suggest that the gender gap is reversed at the lower end but larger at the upper end of the starting salary distribution; the female dummy coefficient is positive and statistically significant, and the interaction term for female gender and salary request is negative and statistically significant.

probit models using three negotiation outcomes, *Less*, *Same* and *More*, in which the differences in applicant and job characteristics are controlled for, corresponding to the models used in Table 5. The full results are reported in Tables A5, A6 and A7 in the Appendix.

Table 6: Probit Regression Results for the Probability to Obtain a Starting Salary that is Below, Equal or Above the Salary Request

	1999-2012		1999-2010			1999-2008		
	Probit <i>Less</i> (1)	Probit <i>Less</i> (2)	Probit <i>Less</i> (3)	Probit <i>Less</i> (4)	Probit <i>Less</i> (5)	Probit <i>Less</i> (6)	Probit <i>Less</i> (7)	Probit <i>Less</i> (8)
Female	0.100 (0.023)***	0.071 (0.023)***	0.107 (0.025)***	0.075 (0.025)***	0.065 (0.026)**	0.119 (0.027)***	0.066 (0.028)**	0.065 (0.029)**
Female [me]	[0.039] (0.009)***	[0.028] (0.009)***	[0.041] (0.009)***	[0.029] (0.010)***	[0.025] (0.010)**	[0.046] (0.010)**	[0.025] (0.011)**	[0.024] (0.011)**
Constant	0.162 (0.018)***	20.203 (5.524)***	0.173 (0.020)***	10.400 (6.993)	38.269 (7.679)***	0.203 (0.022)***	-3.339 (10.862)	-4.646 (11.004)
Controls99-12	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Controls99-10	No	No	No	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Industry dummies	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes
Observations	13394	13394	11457	11457	11457	9314	9314	9314
Ps. R-square	0.001	0.008	0.001	0.009	0.016	0.002	0.016	0.022
	1999-2012		1999-2010			1999-2008		
	Probit <i>More</i> (1)	Probit <i>More</i> (2)	Probit <i>More</i> (3)	Probit <i>More</i> (4)	Probit <i>More</i> (5)	Probit <i>More</i> (6)	Probit <i>More</i> (7)	Probit <i>More</i> (8)
Female	-0.059 (0.029)**	-0.049 (0.030)	-0.081 (0.032)**	-0.063 (0.033)*	-0.057 (0.034)*	-0.106 (0.036)***	-0.079 (0.038)**	-0.077 (0.038)**
Female [me]	[-0.011] (0.006)*	[-0.009] (0.006)	[-0.015] (0.006)**	[-0.011] (0.006)*	[-0.010] (0.006)*	[-0.019] (0.006)***	[-0.014] (0.007)**	[-0.013] (0.007)**
Constant	-1.164 (0.023)***	-50.435 (7.348)***	-1.188 (0.025)***	-33.140 (9.389)***	-48.928 (10.096)***	-1.209 (0.028)***	-25.236 (14.448)*	-24.553 (14.684)*
Controls99-12	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Controls99-10	No	No	No	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Industry dummies	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes
Observations	13394	13394	11457	11457	11457	9314	9314	9301
Ps. R-square	0.000	0.008	0.001	0.006	0.016	0.001	0.017	0.024
	1999-2012		1999-2010			1999-2008		
	Probit <i>Same</i> (1)	Probit <i>Same</i> (2)	Probit <i>Same</i> (3)	Probit <i>Same</i> (4)	Probit <i>Same</i> (5)	Probit <i>Same</i> (6)	Probit <i>Same</i> (7)	Probit <i>Same</i> (8)
Female	-0.080 (0.024)***	-0.053 (0.025)**	-0.081 (0.026)***	-0.055 (0.027)**	-0.045 (0.027)*	-0.081 (0.029)***	-0.034 (0.030)	-0.034 (0.030)
Female [me]	[-0.027] (0.008)**	[-0.018] (0.008)**	[-0.028] (0.009)**	[-0.019] (0.040)**	[-0.015] (0.009)*	[-0.028] (0.010)***	[-0.010] (0.010)	[-0.011] (0.010)
Constant	-0.486 (0.019)***	7.129 (5.880)	-0.481 (0.020)***	6.889 (7.396)	-16.939 (8.079)**	-0.502 (0.023)***	14.415 (11.392)	15.108 (11.543)
Controls99-12	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Controls99-10	No	No	No	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Industry dummies	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes
Observations	13029	13029	11272	11272	11272	9197	9197	9197
Ps. R-square	0.001	0.008	0.001	0.009	0.014	0.001	0.016	0.020

Robust standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$. Note: [me] refers to marginal effects. *Less*, *More* and *Same* are equal to 1 if the salary request is above, below or equal to the starting salary, respectively and 0 otherwise.

Controls 99-12 contain major, age, work sector, temporary job contract, and a linear time trend.

Controls 99-10 contain part-time work, how the job was found and the yearly share of unemployed per major.

Industry dummies refers to 18 industry dummies available in the 1999-2008 sample.

For a full report of all estimates, see Tables A5, A6 and A7 in the Appendix.

Source: Jusek surveys, 1999-2012.

Accounting for observables, female applicants are less likely to be successful in their negotiations, although the difference is small in magnitude, as females are more likely than males to attain a starting salary that is below their requested salary (columns 5, 7 and 8 in Panel A). This gender gap is statistically significant in all models. Estimating the marginal effect using the largest set of controls (column 8),

female applicants are 2.4 percentage points more likely to attain a starting salary below their salary request compared with male applicants. The gender gaps in the probability of attaining a starting salary that is above the requested salary is similarly robust to adding controls (columns 5, 7, and 8 in Panel B). Females are 1.3 percentage points less likely to attain a higher salary than their request (see marginal effect in column 8, Panel B). Results regarding the probability to attain the requested salary as starting salary are, however, not similarly robust to adding all controls (columns 7 and 8, Panel C).

4.3 The Gender Gaps Across the Distribution

The gender gaps may also be evaluated at various points in the distribution rather than only at the mean using quantile regression models. The results using the sample 1999-2010 are reported in Table 7, and the full results are reported in Tables A8, A9 and A10 in the Appendix.¹⁹

Beginning with the gender gap in salary request, Panel A of Table 7 reports the coefficients of the female dummy from the quantile regressions for the log of the salary requests. For illustrative purposes, these coefficients are also plotted for different percentiles in Figure 4, with a 95 percent confidence interval indicated by the grey area. As depicted by the estimates being significantly below 0 and the downward slope, a significant gender gap appears over the entire distribution, with the largest gender gap in the upper part of the distribution. In the lower part of the distribution, the gender gap in salary requests is approximately -1.6 percent, whereas it is -2.3 percent at the median, -3.1 percent at the 75th percentile, and -6.3 percent at the 95th percentile. Estimating also interquantile regressions for the salary requests, as reported in Table A11 in the Appendix, between the 25th-50th, 25th-75th, 50th-75th, and 5th-95th percentiles using bootstrapped standard errors (columns 1-4), the differences between the female dummy coefficients are negative and statistically significant at $p < 0.01$ between the 25th and the 50th, the 25th and the 75th, and the 5th and 95th percentiles, while at $p < 0.05$ between the 50th and 75th percentiles.²⁰

Panel B shows similar gender gaps in starting salaries when requests are not

¹⁹The results are robust to using other samples; see Table A21 in the Appendix for estimations including industry controls.

²⁰Table A22 and A23 display how the gender gap in the probability to state a salary request varies over the starting salary distribution. Although the gender gap is fairly constant over the distribution, there is a larger gender gap towards the top of the starting salary distribution. However, controlling also for industry, the increase in the gender gap at the top of the distribution is attenuated (Table A23).




Figure 4: A plot of the estimates of the female dummy coefficient following quantile regressions of the *salary request* (using bootstrapped standard errors) for the 1999-2010 sample, with controls for field of major, age, year, temporary contract, how the job was found, part time work, the share unemployed within field of major and year (n=11 457).

accounted for, within the group that stated salary requests. However, when accounting for gender gaps in salary requests (see Panel C), the gender gap in starting salaries is small yet fairly constant at approximately -0.7 percent in starting salaries across the distribution, apart from at the 70th to the 85th percentiles where salary requests correspond exactly to starting salaries. Again, for illustrative purposes, these results are displayed in Figure 5. Estimating interquantile regressions also for the starting salaries conditional on salary requests, the differences in the female dummy coefficients are close to zero over most the interval and are not statistically significant.

Notably, comparing the female coefficient estimates in Panels B and C, gender gaps in salary requests (combined with controls for observables) account for approximately two-thirds of the gender gap in starting salaries in the lower half of the distribution, whereas in the upper part of the distribution, the gender gap in salary requests explains between five-sixths of the gender gap or the entire gap in starting

Table 7: Quantile Regression Results for the Salary Requests, Starting Salaries and the Starting Salary Conditional on the Salary Request

<i>Panel A: Quantile Regressions for the Salary Request</i>							
	5th	10th	25th	50th	75th	90th	95th
Female	-0.016 (0.004)***	-0.015 (0.004)***	-0.016 (0.002)***	-0.023 (0.003)***	-0.031 (0.005)***	-0.046 (0.006)***	-0.063 (0.009)***
Constant	-46.984 (1.675)***	-47.723 (1.106)***	-49.980 (0.919)***	-49.749 (0.935)***	-45.061 (1.189)***	-44.556 (1.994)***	-49.666 (2.474)***
Controls99-12	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls99-10	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
<i>Panel B: Quantile Regressions for the Starting Salary</i>							
	5th	10th	25th	50th	75th	90th	95th
Female	-0.017 (0.005)***	-0.021 (0.004)***	-0.021 (0.004)***	-0.026 (0.003)***	-0.036 (0.005)***	-0.051 (0.006)***	-0.058 (0.010)***
Constant	-49.508 (1.346)***	-49.792 (1.269)***	-50.600 (1.135)***	-52.322 (0.721)***	-50.235 (1.013)***	-52.586 (1.932)***	-55.632 (1.552)***
Controls99-12	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls99-10	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
<i>Panel C: Quantile Regressions for the Starting Salary conditional on the Salary Request</i>							
	5th	10th	25th	50th	75th	90th	95th
Female	-0.006 (0.004)	-0.006 (0.004)	-0.008 (0.002)***	-0.008 (0.001)***	0.000 (0.000)*	-0.007 (0.002)***	-0.007 (0.003)**
Constant	-15.548 (1.659)***	-13.687 (1.427)***	-11.099 (0.710)***	-7.985 (0.678)***	0.000 (0.000)	-5.591 (0.680)***	-9.594 (0.958)***
Controls99-12	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls99-10	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Note: N=11 457.

Controls 99-12 contain major, age, work sector, temporary job contract, and a linear time trend.

Controls 99-10 contain part-time work, how the job was found and the yearly share of unemployed per major.

For a full report of all estimates, see Table A8-A10 in the Appendix.

Source: Jusek surveys, 1999-2010.

salaries. Differences in negotiation behavior thus explain more of the gender pay gap among those with higher starting salaries.




Figure 5: A Plot of the Estimates of the Female Dummy Coefficient following Quantile Regressions of the *Starting Salary* (using bootstrapped standard errors) for the 1999-2010 sample, with controls for the salary request, field of major, age, year, temporary contract, how the job was found, part time work, the share unemployed within field of major and year (n=11 457).

5 Robustness

In this section, a few robustness analyses are presented that explore various sub-samples of the surveys containing additional applicant or job information that could be relevant in explaining the above gender gaps. The results are presented in Table 8 and 9, while summary statistics are found in Table A12 and a full report of all results Table A13-A18 in the Appendix.

5.0.1 Working hours

The first argument evaluated is that the gender gaps above arise as a result of male and female applicants applying to different jobs in which the compensation for working overtime differs. Goldin (2014) demonstrates using data on occupations within business and law that the impact of hours on the gender gap is large and can explain much of the gender earnings gap, as individuals who work long hours in these occupations receive a disproportionate increase in earnings. To account for the impact of working long hours a question on the amount of overtime that an applicant worked per week is exploited from the 1999-2010 surveys. Although this amount refers to the hours that the applicant works after accepting employment rather than at the time of employment, the applicants could have been aware of the expectations for longer working hours required or the additional pay expected from working longer hours in different jobs. To ascertain that overtime hours not only picks up associations with industry, I restrict the analysis to 1999-2008 to allow for industry controls.

Males also work significantly longer hours per week compared to females, in particular above 46 hours per week (Table A12).²¹ Accordingly, expecting to work longer hours at the job they apply for, males may request higher starting salaries, and be offered higher salaries, compared to females. Columns 1 and 2 in Table 8 report regression results for the probability of stating a salary request (Panel A), the log of the salary request (Panel B) and the log of the starting salaries conditional on salary requests (Panel C) in which dummies for working 41-45 hours per week, 46-50 hours per week or 51 or more hours per week are included. Table 9, columns 1 and 2, provides the equivalent analyses for the negotiation outcomes *Less*, *Same* and *More*.

Adjusting for working longer hours, in fact, changes the gender gaps in negotiation behavior somewhat, by reducing both the reversed gender gap in the probability to state a salary request, and by modestly reducing the gender gap in salary requests. Also the gender gaps in the negotiation outcomes (conditional on the negotiation behavior) are reduced in starting salaries and in the probability to attain a starting salary that is below the salary request. Still, although controlling for working hours (along with other controls) reduces the gender gaps in both negotiation behavior and outcomes conditional on behavior, the gender gaps remain essentially similar to those found above.²²

²¹Note that a standard working week is 40 hours per week in Sweden.

²²In relation to this point, male and female applicants may differ in their family situation, particularly if male and female applicants differ in terms of having children. Although there are no data on this variable for the full sample, a question on having children was included in the

Table 8: Robustness Analyses: Adding Overtime, Experience, Job Task and Sub-Field of Major

Panel A: Probit Regression for the Probability to State a Salary Request								
	Overtime		Experience		Task		Sub-field	
	Probit <i>Negotiate</i> (1)	Probit <i>Negotiate</i> (2)	Probit <i>Negotiate</i> (3)	Probit <i>Negotiate</i> (4)	Probit <i>Negotiate</i> (5)	Probit <i>Negotiate</i> (6)	Probit <i>Negotiate</i> (7)	Probit <i>Negotiate</i> (8)
Female	0.069 (0.020)***	0.056 (0.020)***	0.065 (0.021)***	0.061 (0.021)***	0.054 (0.024)**	0.042 (0.024)*	0.075 (0.020)***	0.074 (0.020)***
Constant	50.764 (7.654)***	50.117 (7.681)***	56.378 (9.766)***	65.884 (9.930)***	31.507 (8.652)***	32.600 (9.011)***	48.968 (7.700)***	45.874 (7.881)***
Overtime dummies	No	Yes	No	No	No	No	No	No
Experience dummies	No	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	No
Task dummies	No	No	No	No	No	Yes	No	No
Sub-Field dummies	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes
Controls 99-10	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Industry dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
<i>Observations</i>	19340	19340	17693	17693	13831	13831	19155	19155
Ps. R-square	0.093	0.096	0.095	0.099	0.104	0.113	0.094	0.095
Panel B: OLS Regression for the Salary Request								
	Overtime		Experience		Task		Sub-field	
	log Salary Request (1)	log Salary Request (2)	log Salary Request (3)	log Salary Request (4)	log Salary Request (5)	log Salary Request (6)	log Salary Request (7)	log Salary Request (8)
Female	-0.025 (0.003)***	-0.021 (0.003)***	-0.026 (0.003)***	-0.027 (0.003)***	-0.025 (0.004)***	-0.023 (0.003)***	-0.026 (0.003)***	-0.023 (0.003)***
Constant	-50.513 (1.129)***	-50.999 (1.116)***	-49.730 (1.481)***	-47.618 (1.482)***	-53.811 (1.249)***	-53.784 (1.270)***	-50.403 (1.136)***	-51.012 (1.159)***
Overtime dummies	No	Yes	No	No	No	No	No	No
Experience dummies	No	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	No
Task dummies	No	No	No	No	No	Yes	No	No
Sub-Field dummies	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes
Controls 99-10	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Industry dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
<i>Observations</i>	9261	9261	8449	8449	6605	6605	9128	9128
R-square	0.359	0.375	0.328	0.340	0.406	0.428	0.360	0.372
Adj. R-Square	0.357	0.372	0.326	0.337	0.403	0.424	0.358	0.368
Panel C: OLS Regression for the Starting Salary Conditional on the Salary Request								
	Overtime		Experience		Task		Sub-field	
	log Starting Salary (1)	log Starting Salary (2)	log Starting Salary (3)	log Starting Salary (4)	log Starting Salary (5)	log Starting Salary (6)	log Starting Salary (7)	log Starting Salary (8)
Female	-0.006 (0.002)***	-0.005 (0.002)***	-0.006 (0.002)***	-0.006 (0.002)***	-0.005 (0.002)***	-0.005 (0.002)***	-0.006 (0.002)***	-0.005 (0.002)***
log Sal. Request	0.873 (0.008)***	0.870 (0.008)***	0.872 (0.008)***	0.869 (0.008)***	0.870 (0.009)***	0.863 (0.010)***	0.872 (0.008)***	0.871 (0.008)***
Constant	-7.123 (0.753)***	-7.309 (0.754)***	-5.790 (0.923)***	-5.721 (0.939)***	-7.843 (0.884)***	-8.249 (0.908)***	-7.141 (0.754)***	-7.351 (0.776)***
Overtime dummies	No	Yes	No	No	No	No	No	No
Experience dummies	No	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	No
Task dummies	No	No	No	No	No	Yes	No	No
Sub-Field dummies	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes
Controls 99-10	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Industry dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
<i>Observations</i>	9261	9261	8449	8449	6605	6605	9128	9128
R-square	0.808	0.809	0.800	0.801	0.824	0.825	0.809	0.809
Adj. R-Square	0.808	0.808	0.799	0.800	0.823	0.824	0.808	0.808

Robust standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$. *Note:* Overtime dummies refers to four dummy variables for weekly working hours being below 40, 40-45, 45-50 or 50+ hours, respectively. Experience dummies refers to three dummy variables for having no experience, unqualified experience or qualified experience. Task dummies contain dummies for 19 different tasks. Sub-field dummies contain dummies for 18 different fields. Controls 99-10 contain major, age, work sector, temporary job contract, a linear time trend, part-time work, how the job was found and the yearly share of unemployed per major. Industry dummies refers to 18 industry dummies available in the 1999-2008 sample. For a full report of all estimates, see Tables A13-A15 in the Appendix. *Source:* Jusek surveys, 1999-2008.

Table 9: Robustness Analysis: Adding Overtime, Experience, Job Task and Sub-field of Major

Panel A: Probit Regressions of the Probability to Obtain <i>Less</i>								
	Overtime		Experience		Task		Field	
	Probit <i>Less</i> (1)	Probit <i>Less</i> (2)	Probit <i>Less</i> (3)	Probit <i>Less</i> (4)	Probit <i>Less</i> (5)	Probit <i>Less</i> (6)	Probit <i>Less</i> (7)	Probit <i>Less</i> (8)
Female	0.062 (0.029)**	0.058 (0.029)**	0.067 (0.030)**	0.067 (0.030)**	0.057 (0.034)*	0.059 (0.034)*	0.057 (0.029)**	0.054 (0.029)*
Constant	-3.844 (11.021)	-3.427 (11.027)	-28.307 (14.397)**	-27.657 (14.686)*	1.207 (12.430)	1.846 (12.998)	-4.042 (11.067)	-2.781 (11.379)
Overtime dummies	No	Yes	No	No	No	No	No	No
Experience dummies	No	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	No
Task dummies	No	No	No	No	No	Yes	No	No
Field dummies	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes
Controls99-10	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Industry dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
<i>Observations</i>	9261	9261	8449	8449	6605	6605	9128	9128
Ps. R-square	0.022	0.022	0.022	0.023	0.023	0.026	0.021	0.023

Panel B: Probit Regressions of the Probability to Obtain <i>More</i>								
	Overtime		Experience		Task		Field	
	Probit <i>More</i> (1)	Probit <i>More</i> (2)	Probit <i>More</i> (3)	Probit <i>More</i> (4)	Probit <i>More</i> (5)	Probit <i>More</i> (6)	Probit <i>More</i> (7)	Probit <i>More</i> (8)
Female	-0.074 (0.038)*	-0.068 (0.038)*	-0.078 (0.040)*	-0.079 (0.040)**	-0.064 (0.045)	0.059 (0.034)*	-0.072 (0.038)*	-0.075 (0.039)*
Constant	-26.240 (14.748)*	-26.892 (14.757)*	-4.346 (19.405)	-6.234 (19.758)	-31.883 (16.752)*	1.846 (12.998)	-22.957 (14.766)	-23.684 (15.181)
Overtime dummies	No	Yes	No	No	No	No	No	No
Experience dummies	No	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	No
Task dummies	No	No	No	No	No	Yes	No	No
Field dummies	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes
Controls99-10	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Industry dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
<i>Observations</i>	9248	9248	8436	8436	6595	6605	9116	9116
Ps. R-square	0.024	0.025	0.024	0.025	0.028	0.026	0.023	0.028

Panel C: Probit Regressions of the Probability to Obtain <i>Same</i>								
	Overtime		Experience		Task		Field	
	Probit <i>Same</i> (1)	Probit <i>Same</i> (2)	Probit <i>Same</i> (3)	Probit <i>Same</i> (4)	Probit <i>Same</i> (5)	Probit <i>Same</i> (6)	Probit <i>Same</i> (7)	Probit <i>Same</i> (8)
Female	-0.033 (0.030)	-0.031 (0.030)	-0.036 (0.031)	-0.037 (0.031)	-0.037 (0.035)	-0.037 (0.036)	-0.029 (0.030)	-0.027 (0.031)
Constant	15.312 (11.558)	15.186 (11.563)	29.832 (15.127)**	30.242 (15.451)*	12.019 (12.979)	9.346 (13.582)	13.900 (11.611)	13.416 (11.938)
Overtime dummies	No	Yes	No	No	No	No	No	No
Experience dummies	No	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	No
Task dummies	No	No	No	No	No	Yes	No	No
Field dummies	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes
Controls99-10	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Industry dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
<i>Observations</i>	9146	9146	8335	8335	6516	6516	9014	9014
Ps. R-square	0.021	0.021	0.021	0.022	0.019	0.022	0.020	0.021

Robust standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$. *Note:* Overtime dummies refers to four dummy variables for weekly working hours being below 40, 40-45, 45-50 or 50+ hours. Experience dummies refers to three dummy variables for having no experience, unqualified experience or qualified experience. Task dummies contain dummies for 19 different tasks. Sub-field dummies contain dummies for 18 different sub-fields of major. *Less*, *More* and *Same* are dummy variables for the salary request being above, below or equal to the starting salary, respectively. Controls 99-10 contain major, age, work sector, temporary job contract, a linear time trend, part-time work, how the job was found and the yearly share of unemployed per major. Industry dummies refers to 18 industry dummies available in the 1999-2008 sample. For a full report of all estimates, see Tables A16-A18 in the Appendix. *Source:* Jusek surveys, 1999-2008.

5.0.2 Experience

The second explored argument is that although the sample contains young graduates—thus implying that previous experience is likely to be more limited—gender gaps in labor market experience explain the gender gaps documented above. This explanation can be explored following a question from the 1999-2007 surveys in which a respondent can report having no experience or unqualified or qualified relevant experience prior to employment. There is a gender gap in labor market experience; however, it is a reversed gender gap with female applicants having more, and more skilled experience compared to the male applicants (Table A12).

Nevertheless, controlling for these differences (and the same employee and job characteristics as in previous sections), again conveys the same finding as in the previous section (columns 3 and 4 in Panel A-C, Table 8 and Table 9).

5.0.3 Job Task

A third explanation to the gender gaps in negotiation behavior, or in outcomes, could potentially be that even with the same field of major, male and female applicants apply for jobs with differently remunerated job tasks. To test this argument I use job task information following replies to the question: "*Which are your main tasks?*" with 19-25 different tasks (re-grouped to 19 categories) to choose from included in the 1999–2005, 2007 and 2008 surveys.

Although there are no large differences by gender, there are some gender gaps in job task; females are more likely to report working with "Administration" and "Accounting" and less likely to report working with "Programming" and "System Development" compared to males (for more details see Table A12).²³ Although controlling for these gender gaps in tasks in the regressions (columns 5 and 6 in Panel A-C of Tables 8 and 9), reduces the reversed gender gap in the propensity to state a salary request, the gender gaps found above are essentially unchanged.²⁴

2004 survey. In this year, 16 % of the male applicants had children, while 6 % of the females had children. Thus, few applicants had children in the sample, and males were actually more likely to have children than female applicants were.

²³Dividing the tasks within each field of major, all tasks are represented within each major, yet for some tasks there are too few observations to make adequate comparisons by gender. However, the gender gap in administrative tasks is significant within each field of major.

²⁴To further account for task qualification level potentially explaining the gender gaps in negotiation behavior or outcomes, the regressions were re-run with controls based on the reply to a related question "*Do you perform tasks requiring qualified skills?*" included in the 1999-2001 and 2004-2010 surveys. Approximately 16 % of females compared to 13 % of male applicants report having unskilled tasks. Again, the gender gaps are robust to the inclusion of task requirements in all models (Table A24 in the Appendix).

5.0.4 Sub-field of major

A final explored argument is that male and female applicants may have graduated in different sub-fields within their field of major, and these may be differently remunerated, or valued, in a job. Information on sub-field of major (the field of the bachelor degree) was provided in the 1999-2008 surveys.

There are some gender differences in choice of subfield; female applicants are less likely to have a degree in finance, economics and computer science, while more likely to have a degree in sociology, media, pedagogics, and psychology (Table A12). Allowing for this more refined control for educational differences by gender in Tables 8 and 9, only slightly reduces the gender gaps in negotiation behaviour, while changes the gender gap in starting salaries conditional on salary requests somewhat. Still, again the results shown above remain robust to the inclusion of sub-field of major.²⁵

6 Discussion

Estimating negotiation behavior and outcomes in a unified framework for a large and homogenous sample provided evidence of negotiations systematically varying by gender also in the field. First, females behaved differently in the negotiation; although the female applicants in this sample were more likely to negotiate their starting salaries, they tended to request lower mean salaries than did comparable males, especially among those who requested the highest salaries. Second, conditional on this behavior, the results showed that females attained poorer outcomes compared with males; a larger share of females attained starting salaries below their requested salaries, and although the gender gap was small in magnitude, female starting salaries were lower than male starting salaries for the same requests.

The gender gaps found are noteworthy because they appear for such homogenous groups as recent college graduates in only five fields of major. Thus, the groups are arguably expected to be similar in terms of career prospects, ambitions and family concerns. Moreover, although the job and employee controls were important and reduced the gender gaps, they explained only part of the gender gaps in salary requests and starting salaries, leaving approximately 70 percent unexplained. Accounting for females' requesting lower salaries reduced the unexplained part of the gender gap in starting salaries to 17 percent. Interestingly, consistent with findings of a salary

²⁵One concern could be that respondents may not recall the salary negotiation considering the 1-1.5 year time span of the survey. To account for differences in recall, the main models have been re-estimated with the inclusion of number of years since the graduation and the time of the survey, and results are robust to accounting for this measure of recall, see Table A24 in the Appendix

glass ceiling (see, e.g., Blau and Kahn 2016; Albrecht et al. 2015; Albrecht et al. 2003), the gender gaps in salary requests and starting salaries increased throughout the pay distribution, but when we accounted for gender differences in salary requests, the starting salary gender gap was small and constant. Quantile regression estimates also indicated that gender gaps in negotiation behavior were more important in explaining the gender pay gap among those with the highest starting salaries. This result is also consistent with the findings of Card, Cardoso and Kline (2016), who report that negotiation effects are more important in explaining gender pay gaps for high-skilled females than for lower-skilled females.

One concern, however, is that the above patterns arise from an unobserved heterogeneity between male and female applicants in applicant- or job-related characteristics, particularly among applicants with high salary requests, rather than from gender differences in negotiation behavior or outcomes. Although this possibility cannot be excluded, as mentioned above, given that the data contain a sample of recent graduates and refer to negotiation for new graduates' first job, differences by applicants are likely to be more limited than they would if we evaluated the behavior or outcomes for males and females with longer careers. The surveys also allowed for a fairly large set of controls.²⁶

Although the study provides no basis for evaluating the mechanisms leading to negotiation patterns being different by gender, I outline two mechanisms that would be consistent with the findings shown in this paper. The first mechanisms may be gender difference in the degree of willingness to take risks, which is a gender difference that is commonly shown in the literature (e.g., Charness and Gneezy, 2012). In particular, this explanation would be in line with a larger gender gap at the upper end of the salary request distribution. However, it is less clear how a lower willingness to take risks among females would explain why females were more likely to state salary requests. The same reasoning would apply to an explanation based on male and females having different preferences for competitive settings. The selection pattern in negotiations neither suggested that differences in the propensity to state a salary request were related to gender differences in attributes that resemble risk aversion, such as not daring to state a salary request.²⁷

²⁶Nevertheless, one such difference by gender may emerge if male applicants have better grades than female applicants. However, females earned better grades in upper secondary schools than men did in 1999 and 2012 (Universitetskanslerämbetet, 2014), and females scored higher in their performance and completion rates (measured by the number of credits achieved relative to enrolled credits per semester) than men did between 1999 and 2007 at the university, particularly among social science majors (National Board for Higher Education, 2008). This concern may therefore be of more limited importance.

²⁷In a complementary paper on gender gaps in attitudes toward negotiation using two of the

The second mechanism is based on gender stereotypes being important in explaining negotiation patterns, as the results found are consistent with a large body of research within social psychology proposing that gender stereotypes explain gender gaps in negotiation behavior and outcomes (for an overview, see Bowles 2013). The argument is that gender stereotypes would prescribe males to be more competitive (thus, asking for more) and females to be more cooperative (thus, asking for less) in a negotiation. Females and males would then conform to these behaviors, as other individuals would view or treat them negatively if their behaviors depart from these gender stereotypes (Kray et al 2001). Supporting this argument, Bowles, Babcock and Lai (2007) show that assertive negotiation behavior from females is penalized more than that from males. Moreover, male evaluators are more willing to work with females who accept their compensation offers than those who do not, despite being perceived as equally capable. Amantullah and Tinsley (2013) also find evidence of self-advocating females being seen as dominant, with peers not wanting to interact with them. Thus, in the context of this paper, by asking for the same salary as a similar male would, females are not behaving according to prescribed stereotype roles and, hence, for given salary requests, their behavior would result in a backlash in the form of a lower starting salary. To avoid this outcome, females adjust by stating lower requests in negotiations.

7 Concluding Remarks

This paper provides evidence of gender gaps in negotiation behavior and outcomes uniquely evaluated in the field. Gender differences in negotiations have been suggested as one explanation for the persistent gender differences in labor market outcomes, especially for the glass ceiling. Following salary negotiations between recent college graduates and their prospective employers at the time of employment, this paper shows that gender is relevant both to negotiation behavior and to the outcome of the negotiation. In particular, although females stated salary requests and thus also negotiated, those who did negotiate requested lower salaries compared with similar males applying to similar jobs. This difference was especially large among those with high salary requests. This gender gap in negotiation behavior also explained a substantial portion of the gender gap in starting salaries. However,

surveys I show that male and female applicants differed somewhat in having a positive attitude towards the negotiation, with female applicants less likely to experience negotiations as stimulating or positive compared with males (Säve-Söderbergh 2015). However, among both male and female applicants, very few found the negotiations to be uncomfortable or threatening.

compared with males, females attained poorer outcomes, as a small gender gap in starting salaries remained also when accounting for negotiation behavior. Besides this, a larger share of the female applicants attained starting salaries that were lower than their requested salaries.

The findings yield important policy implications. Following both behaviors within the negotiation and the subsequent outcome for the same individual, this study highlights the importance of considering gender gaps in negotiation behavior in particular. In fact, the gender gap in starting salaries is largely reduced when accounting for females stating lower salary requests, especially among those for which greater behavioral differences are observed. Nevertheless, given that the sample studied is homogeneous in many respects, it is noteworthy that a gender gap, although small in magnitude, remained across nearly the entire distribution, suggesting that factors beyond negotiation behavior are contributing to gender gaps in starting salaries.

Nevertheless, more research on negotiation is necessary to evaluate what causes these gender gaps. This study can provide only descriptive evidence. Furthermore, this study captures gender differences in a select and highly educated group, and thus, the extent to which the gender gap applies to other groups in the labor market is an interesting avenue to explore.

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A Appendix Figures




Figure 6: The Share of Females Within each Field of Major in 1999-2012,
Source: Statistics Sweden




Figure 7: The Share of Females Within each Field of Major based on *Jusek* Survey Responses. *Source: Jusek* surveys 1999-2012




Figure 8: The Distribution of Salary Requests, separate by Gender, 1999-2012




Figure 9: The Distribution of Starting Salaries, separate by Gender, 1999-2012

B Appendix Tables

Table A1: Probit Regression Results for the Probability to State a Salary Request (corresponds to *Table 3* in the paper)

	1999-2012		1999-2010			1999-2008		
	Probit <i>Negotiate</i>	Probit <i>Negotiate</i>	Probit <i>Negotiate</i>	Probit <i>Negotiate</i>	Probit <i>Negotiate</i>	Probit <i>Negotiate</i>	Probit <i>Negotiate</i>	Probit <i>Negotiate</i>
Female	0.048 (0.015)***	0.058 (0.016)***	0.039 (0.017)**	0.057 (0.017)***	0.057 (0.018)***	0.038 (0.019)**	0.077 (0.020)***	0.071 (0.020)***
Law		-0.324 (0.023)***		-0.346 (0.025)***	-0.360 (0.025)***		-0.413 (0.028)***	-0.124 (0.033)***
Comp. science		0.149 (0.027)***		0.141 (0.029)***	0.230 (0.030)***		0.202 (0.031)***	0.158 (0.035)***
Manag/org		0.139 (0.026)***		0.158 (0.029)***	0.145 (0.029)***		0.112 (0.034)***	0.084 (0.035)**
Social science		0.065 (0.022)***		0.070 (0.024)***	0.146 (0.026)***		0.137 (0.029)***	0.075 (0.030)**
Gov. sector		-0.195 (0.019)***		-0.203 (0.021)***	-0.213 (0.021)***		-0.222 (0.024)***	
Munic. sector		0.270 (0.026)***		0.274 (0.029)***	0.256 (0.029)***		0.245 (0.034)***	
Temporary		-0.007 (0.016)		-0.004 (0.018)	0.011 (0.018)		0.038 (0.021)*	-0.019 (0.021)
Age25-30		0.063 (0.021)***		0.108 (0.023)***	0.117 (0.023)***		0.194 (0.026)***	0.186 (0.026)***
Age30+		0.150 (0.025)***		0.247 (0.028)***	0.246 (0.028)***		0.410 (0.032)***	0.374 (0.033)***
Year		-0.035 (0.002)***		-0.036 (0.002)***	-0.023 (0.003)***		-0.022 (0.004)***	-0.024 (0.004)***
Part time				0.002 (0.018)	0.002 (0.018)		0.006 (0.020)	-0.051 (0.021)**
UE major				-2.194 (0.207)***	-2.389 (0.207)***		-2.389 (0.222)***	-2.206 (0.229)***
Contacted Self				-0.179 (0.028)***	-0.151 (0.028)***		-0.151 (0.031)***	-0.181 (0.032)***
Offered Job				-0.049 (0.028)*	-0.049 (0.028)*		-0.031 (0.031)	-0.086 (0.032)***
Network				-0.093 (0.024)***	-0.093 (0.024)***		-0.067 (0.027)**	-0.120 (0.027)***
Agency				0.126 (0.028)***	0.126 (0.028)***		0.168 (0.031)***	0.092 (0.031)***
Other				-0.523 (0.033)***	-0.523 (0.033)***		-0.472 (0.038)***	-0.432 (0.040)***
Constant	-0.144 (0.012)***	69.762 (3.768)***	-0.107 (0.013)***	71.795 (4.837)***	46.043 (5.225)***	-0.083 (0.015)***	43.588 (7.354)***	47.585 (7.645)***
Industry dummies	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes
Obs.	29182	29182	24352	24352	24352	19526	19526	19526
Ps. R-square	0.000	0.033	0.000	0.035	0.049	0.000	0.055	0.093

Robust standard errors in parentheses

Note: The table shows a full report of all estimates corresponding to those displayed in Table 3.

Negotiate is equal to 1 if the applicant stated a salary request and 0 otherwise.

Industry dummies refers to 18 industry dummies available in the 1999-2008 sample.

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table A2: OLS Regression Results for the log of the Salary Request (corresponds to *Panel A Table 5* in the paper)

	1999-2012		1999-2010			1999-2008		
	log Salary Request	log Salary Request	log Salary Request	log Salary Request	log Salary Request	log Salary Request	log Salary Request	log Salary Request
Female	-0.038 (0.003)***	-0.035 (0.003)***	-0.037 (0.004)***	-0.034 (0.003)***	-0.031 (0.003)***	-0.037 (0.004)***	-0.027 (0.003)***	-0.026 (0.003)***
Law		-0.002 (0.004)		-0.005 (0.004)	-0.003 (0.004)		-0.008 (0.004)*	-0.006 (0.005)
Comp. science		0.026 (0.004)***		0.029 (0.004)***	0.026 (0.004)***		0.025 (0.004)***	0.011 (0.005)**
Manag/org		-0.025 (0.004)***		-0.023 (0.004)***	-0.024 (0.004)***		-0.024 (0.004)***	-0.025 (0.005)***
Social science		-0.024 (0.004)***		-0.026 (0.004)***	-0.034 (0.004)***		-0.030 (0.004)***	-0.032 (0.005)***
Gov. sector		-0.032 (0.003)***		-0.038 (0.003)***	-0.036 (0.003)***		-0.045 (0.003)***	0.173 (0.007)***
Munic. sector		-0.025 (0.003)***		-0.032 (0.004)***	-0.028 (0.004)***		-0.033 (0.004)***	-0.093 (0.037)**
Temporary		-0.028 (0.002)***		-0.025 (0.003)***	-0.025 (0.003)***		-0.025 (0.003)***	-0.024 (0.003)***
Age25-30		0.013 (0.003)***		0.023 (0.004)***	0.021 (0.004)***		0.041 (0.004)***	0.042 (0.004)***
Age30+		0.044 (0.004)***		0.069 (0.005)***	0.069 (0.005)***		0.101 (0.005)***	0.101 (0.005)***
Year		0.027 (0.000)***		0.029 (0.000)***	0.029 (0.000)***		0.030 (0.001)***	0.030 (0.001)***
Part time					-0.029 (0.003)***		-0.027 (0.003)***	-0.026 (0.003)***
UE major					0.193 (0.033)***		0.159 (0.035)***	0.187 (0.035)***
Contacted Self					0.001 (0.004)		0.002 (0.005)	0.001 (0.005)
Offered Job					0.036 (0.005)***		0.033 (0.005)***	0.030 (0.005)***
Network					0.016 (0.004)***		0.016 (0.004)***	0.013 (0.004)***
Agency					0.006 (0.004)*		0.008 (0.004)*	0.003 (0.004)
Other					0.005 (0.006)		0.009 (0.006)	0.005 (0.006)
Constant	10.029 (0.003)***	-43.507 (0.621)***	10.009 (0.003)***	-48.279 (0.771)***	-47.444 (0.850)***	9.981 (0.003)***	-49.514 (1.130)***	-50.579 (1.127)***
Industry dummies	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes
Obs.	13394	13394	11457	11457	11457	9314	9314	9314
R-square	0.010	0.387	0.010	0.368	0.380	0.011	0.345	0.360
Adj. R-Square	0.010	0.387	0.010	0.367	0.379	0.011	0.343	0.357

Robust standard errors in parentheses.

Note: The table shows a full report of all estimates corresponding to those displayed in Table 5, Panel A.

Industry dummies refers to 18 industry dummies available in the 1999-2008 sample.

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table A3: OLS Regression Results for the log of the Starting Salary (corresponds to *Panel B Table 5* in the paper)

	1999-2012		1999-2010			1999-2008		
	log Starting Salary	log Starting Salary	log Starting Salary	log Starting Salary	log Starting Salary	log Starting Salary	log Starting Salary	log Starting Salary
Female	-0.040 (0.003)***	-0.038 (0.003)***	-0.041 (0.004)***	-0.037 (0.003)***	-0.034 (0.003)***	-0.041 (0.004)***	-0.030 (0.003)***	-0.029 (0.003)***
Law		-0.000 (0.004)		-0.004 (0.004)	-0.003 (0.004)		-0.008 (0.004)*	-0.004 (0.005)
Comp. science		0.032 (0.004)***		0.033 (0.004)***	0.037 (0.004)***		0.034 (0.005)***	0.015 (0.005)***
Manag/org		-0.022 (0.004)***		-0.020 (0.004)***	-0.020 (0.004)***		-0.021 (0.005)***	-0.022 (0.005)***
Social science		-0.021 (0.004)***		-0.023 (0.004)***	-0.023 (0.004)***		-0.018 (0.005)***	-0.022 (0.005)***
Gov. sector		-0.031 (0.003)***		-0.040 (0.003)***	-0.036 (0.003)***		-0.045 (0.004)***	0.126 (0.007)***
Munic. sector		-0.021 (0.003)***		-0.030 (0.004)***	-0.026 (0.004)***		-0.031 (0.004)***	-0.074 (0.027)***
Temporary		-0.032 (0.003)***		-0.031 (0.003)***	-0.028 (0.003)***		-0.028 (0.003)***	-0.027 (0.003)***
Age25-30		0.016 (0.003)***		0.025 (0.004)***	0.024 (0.004)***		0.045 (0.004)***	0.045 (0.004)***
Age30+		0.044 (0.005)***		0.068 (0.005)***	0.069 (0.005)***		0.102 (0.005)***	0.102 (0.005)***
Year		0.027 (0.000)***		0.030 (0.000)***	0.030 (0.000)***		0.030 (0.001)***	0.031 (0.001)***
Part time					-0.031 (0.003)***		-0.029 (0.003)***	-0.028 (0.003)***
UE major					-0.025 (0.034)		-0.031 (0.036)	0.010 (0.036)
Contacted Self					-0.011 (0.005)**		-0.010 (0.005)**	-0.010 (0.005)**
Offered Job					0.033 (0.005)***		0.030 (0.005)***	0.025 (0.005)***
Network					0.009 (0.004)**		0.009 (0.004)*	0.006 (0.004)
Agency					0.006 (0.004)		0.008 (0.004)*	0.003 (0.004)
Other					0.003 (0.006)		0.007 (0.006)	0.002 (0.006)
Constant	9.987 (0.003)***	-44.873 (0.640)***	9.966 (0.003)***	-49.482 (0.804)***	-50.844 (0.894)***	9.935 (0.003)***	-50.109 (1.188)***	-51.217 (1.181)***
Industry dummies	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes
Obs.	13394	13394	11457	11457	11457	9314	9314	9314
R-square	0.011	0.382	0.012	0.360	0.372	0.014	0.318	0.337
Adj. R-Square	0.011	0.382	0.012	0.360	0.371	0.014	0.317	0.334

Robust standard errors in parentheses.

Note: The table shows a full report of all estimates corresponding to those displayed in Table 5, Panel B.

Industry dummies refers to 18 industry dummies available in the 1999-2008 sample.

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table A4: OLS Regression Results for the log of the Starting Salary conditional on Salary Requests (corresponds to *Panel C, Table 5* in the paper)

	1999-2012		1999-2010			1999-2008		
	log Starting Salary	log Starting Salary	log Starting Salary	log Starting Salary	log Starting Salary	log Starting Salary	log Starting Salary	log Starting Salary
Female	-0.005 (0.001)***	-0.007 (0.001)***	-0.006 (0.002)***	-0.007 (0.002)***	-0.006 (0.002)***	-0.008 (0.002)***	-0.006 (0.002)***	-0.006 (0.002)***
log Sal. Request	0.935 (0.004)***	0.881 (0.006)***	0.933 (0.005)***	0.884 (0.007)***	0.884 (0.007)***	0.907 (0.006)***	0.878 (0.008)***	0.873 (0.008)***
Law		0.001 (0.002)		0.001 (0.002)	-0.001 (0.002)		-0.001 (0.003)	0.001 (0.003)
Comp. science		0.009 (0.002)***		0.007 (0.002)***	0.013 (0.002)***		0.012 (0.002)***	0.005 (0.003)*
Manag/org		-0.001 (0.002)		0.000 (0.002)	0.001 (0.002)		-0.000 (0.003)	-0.001 (0.003)
Social science		-0.000 (0.002)		0.000 (0.002)	0.007 (0.002)***		0.008 (0.002)***	0.005 (0.002)**
Gov. sector		-0.003 (0.002)*		-0.006 (0.002)***	-0.005 (0.002)***		-0.005 (0.002)***	-0.025 (0.004)***
Munic. sector		0.001 (0.002)		-0.002 (0.002)	-0.001 (0.002)		-0.002 (0.002)	0.007 (0.020)
Temporary		-0.008 (0.001)***		-0.009 (0.001)***	-0.006 (0.001)***		-0.006 (0.002)***	-0.006 (0.002)***
Age25-30		0.005 (0.002)**		0.005 (0.002)**	0.005 (0.002)**		0.009 (0.002)***	0.008 (0.002)***
Age30+		0.005 (0.002)**		0.007 (0.002)***	0.008 (0.002)***		0.014 (0.003)***	0.013 (0.003)***
Year		0.004 (0.000)***		0.004 (0.000)***	0.005 (0.000)***		0.004 (0.000)***	0.004 (0.000)***
Part time					-0.006 (0.002)***		-0.005 (0.002)***	-0.005 (0.002)***
UE major					-0.196 (0.019)***		-0.170 (0.020)***	-0.153 (0.020)***
Contacted Self					-0.012 (0.002)***		-0.012 (0.003)***	-0.011 (0.003)***
Offered Job					0.001 (0.002)		0.001 (0.003)	-0.001 (0.003)
Network					-0.005 (0.002)**		-0.004 (0.002)*	-0.005 (0.002)**
Agency					0.000 (0.002)		0.001 (0.002)	0.001 (0.002)
Other					-0.001 (0.003)		-0.001 (0.003)	-0.002 (0.003)
Constant	0.606 (0.044)***	-6.549 (0.438)***	0.629 (0.048)***	-6.814 (0.535)***	-8.880 (0.573)***	0.880 (0.057)***	-6.652 (0.739)***	-7.057 (0.751)***
Industry dummies	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes
Obs.	13394	13394	11457	11457	11457	9314	9314	9314
R-square	0.824	0.829	0.819	0.823	0.826	0.801	0.806	0.809
Adj. R-Square	0.824	0.829	0.819	0.823	0.826	0.801	0.806	0.808

Robust standard errors in parentheses.

Note: The table shows a full report of all estimates corresponding to those displayed in Table 5, Panel C.

Industry dummies refers to 18 industry dummies available in the 1999-2008 sample.

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table A5: Probit Regression Results for the Probability to Obtain a Starting Salary that is Lower than the Salary Request (corresponds to *Panel A, Table 6* in the paper)

	1999-2012		1999-2010			1999-2008		
	Probit <i>Less</i>	Probit <i>Less</i>	Probit <i>Less</i>	Probit <i>Less</i>	Probit <i>Less</i>	Probit <i>Less</i>	Probit <i>Less</i>	Probit <i>Less</i>
Female	0.100 (0.023)***	0.071 (0.023)***	0.107 (0.025)***	0.075 (0.025)***	0.065 (0.026)**	0.119 (0.027)***	0.066 (0.028)**	0.065 (0.029)**
Law		-0.040 (0.035)		-0.036 (0.038)	-0.011 (0.038)		-0.009 (0.043)	-0.004 (0.045)
Comp. science		-0.002 (0.037)		0.008 (0.039)	-0.071 (0.040)*		-0.058 (0.042)	0.031 (0.048)
Manag/org		0.073 (0.036)**		0.061 (0.040)	0.051 (0.040)		0.062 (0.046)	0.073 (0.047)
Social science		-0.038 (0.033)		-0.047 (0.035)	-0.150 (0.037)***		-0.133 (0.041)***	-0.100 (0.042)**
Gov. sector		0.243 (0.029)***		0.281 (0.031)***	0.272 (0.032)***		0.258 (0.035)***	
Munic. sector		0.141 (0.034)***		0.170 (0.038)***	0.162 (0.038)***		0.151 (0.044)***	
Temporary		0.085 (0.024)***		0.083 (0.026)***	0.052 (0.026)**		0.055 (0.029)*	0.068 (0.029)**
Age25-30		-0.044 (0.031)		-0.043 (0.034)	-0.044 (0.034)		-0.078 (0.039)**	-0.065 (0.039)*
Age30+		-0.008 (0.037)		-0.016 (0.040)	-0.020 (0.040)		-0.056 (0.046)	-0.035 (0.046)
Year		-0.010 (0.003)***		-0.005 (0.003)	-0.019 (0.004)***		0.002 (0.005)	0.002 (0.005)
Part time				0.024 (0.026)	0.030 (0.026)		0.030 (0.029)	0.020 (0.029)
UE major				2.852 (0.310)***	2.852 (0.310)***		2.419 (0.332)***	2.215 (0.338)***
Contacted Self				0.088 (0.041)**	0.088 (0.041)**		0.088 (0.046)*	0.073 (0.046)
Offered Job				0.022 (0.039)	0.022 (0.039)		0.025 (0.043)	0.049 (0.044)
Network				0.029 (0.034)	0.029 (0.034)		0.021 (0.038)	0.030 (0.038)
Agency				0.049 (0.038)	0.049 (0.038)		0.035 (0.041)	0.029 (0.042)
Other				0.103 (0.057)*	0.103 (0.057)*		0.137 (0.065)**	0.160 (0.066)**
Constant	0.162 (0.018)***	20.203 (5.524)***	0.173 (0.020)***	10.400 (6.993)	38.269 (7.679)***	0.203 (0.022)***	-3.339 (10.862)	-4.646 (11.004)
Industry dummies	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes
Obs.	13394	13394	11457	11457	11457	9314	9314	9314
Ps. R-square	0.001	0.008	0.001	0.009	0.016	0.002	0.016	0.022

Robust standard errors in parentheses.

Note: The table shows a full report of all estimates corresponding to those displayed in Table 6, Panel A.

Industry dummies refers to 18 industry dummies available in the 1999-2008 sample.

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table A6: Probit Regression Results for the Probability to Obtain a Starting Salary that is Higher than the Salary Request (corresponds to *Panel B, Table 6* in the paper)

	1999-2012		1999-2010			1999-2008		
	Probit <i>More</i>	Probit <i>More</i>	Probit <i>More</i>	Probit <i>More</i>	Probit <i>More</i>	Probit <i>More</i>	Probit <i>More</i>	Probit <i>More</i>
Female	-0.059 (0.029)**	-0.049 (0.030)	-0.081 (0.032)**	-0.063 (0.033)*	-0.057 (0.034)*	-0.106 (0.036)***	-0.079 (0.038)**	-0.077 (0.038)**
Law		-0.001 (0.046)		-0.029 (0.051)	-0.030 (0.052)		0.003 (0.058)	0.046 (0.060)
Comp. science		0.078 (0.048)		0.041 (0.051)	0.093 (0.052)*		0.081 (0.055)	0.006 (0.064)
Manag/org		-0.030 (0.047)		-0.027 (0.054)	-0.012 (0.054)		-0.018 (0.064)	-0.027 (0.064)
Social science		-0.007 (0.042)		0.004 (0.046)	0.069 (0.049)		0.063 (0.055)	0.040 (0.056)
Gov. sector		0.047 (0.038)		-0.010 (0.042)	-0.034 (0.042)		-0.016 (0.047)	
Munic. sector		-0.013 (0.046)		-0.043 (0.051)	-0.069 (0.052)		-0.087 (0.061)	
Temporary		-0.106 (0.031)***		-0.134 (0.034)***	-0.104 (0.035)***		-0.138 (0.039)***	-0.147 (0.040)***
Age25-30		0.098 (0.040)**		0.112 (0.046)**	0.114 (0.046)**		0.109 (0.054)**	0.090 (0.054)*
Age30+		-0.021 (0.049)		-0.005 (0.055)	0.005 (0.055)		-0.014 (0.064)	-0.042 (0.064)
Year		0.025 (0.004)***		0.016 (0.005)***	0.024 (0.005)***		0.012 (0.007)*	0.012 (0.007)
Part time					-0.063 (0.034)*		-0.049 (0.039)	-0.048 (0.040)
UE major					-1.467 (0.418)***		-1.143 (0.448)**	-0.814 (0.450)*
Contacted Self					-0.296 (0.059)***		-0.277 (0.065)***	-0.251 (0.066)***
Offered Job					-0.282 (0.055)***		-0.316 (0.063)***	-0.323 (0.064)***
Network					-0.182 (0.046)***		-0.203 (0.052)***	-0.210 (0.052)***
Agency					0.008 (0.048)		0.028 (0.052)	0.041 (0.053)
Other					-0.141 (0.074)*		-0.110 (0.084)	-0.106 (0.085)
Constant	-1.164 (0.023)***	-50.435 (7.348)***	-1.188 (0.025)***	-33.140 (9.389)***	-48.928 (10.096)***	-1.209 (0.028)***	-25.236 (14.448)*	-24.553 (14.684)*
Industry dummies	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes
Obs.	13394	13394	11457	11457	11457	9314	9314	9301
Ps. R-square	0.000	0.008	0.001	0.006	0.016	0.001	0.017	0.024

Robust standard errors in parentheses.

Note: The table shows a full report of all estimates corresponding to those displayed in Table 6, Panel B.

Industry dummies refers to 18 industry dummies available in the 1999-2008 sample.

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table A7: Probit Regression Results for the Probability to Obtain a Starting Salary that is the Same as the Salary Request (corresponds to *Panel C, Table 6* in the paper)

	1999-2012		1999-2010			1999-2008		
	Probit <i>Same</i>	Probit <i>Same</i>	Probit <i>Same</i>	Probit <i>Same</i>	Probit <i>Same</i>	Probit <i>Same</i>	Probit <i>Same</i>	Probit <i>Same</i>
Female	-0.080 (0.024)***	-0.053 (0.025)**	-0.081 (0.026)***	-0.055 (0.027)**	-0.045 (0.027)*	-0.081 (0.029)***	-0.034 (0.030)	-0.034 (0.030)
Law		0.043 (0.037)		0.057 (0.040)	0.029 (0.040)		0.011 (0.045)	-0.012 (0.048)
Comp. science		-0.042 (0.039)		-0.030 (0.041)	0.029 (0.042)		0.020 (0.044)	-0.038 (0.050)
Manag/org		-0.060 (0.038)		-0.059 (0.042)	-0.053 (0.042)		-0.067 (0.049)	-0.075 (0.050)
Social science		0.046 (0.034)		0.048 (0.037)	0.131 (0.039)***		0.119 (0.043)***	0.095 (0.044)**
Gov. sector		-0.306 (0.031)***		-0.313 (0.033)***	-0.291 (0.034)***		-0.288 (0.037)***	
Munic. sector		-0.161 (0.037)***		-0.176 (0.040)***	-0.155 (0.041)***		-0.138 (0.047)***	
Temporary		-0.032 (0.025)		-0.018 (0.027)	0.001 (0.027)		0.013 (0.030)	0.004 (0.031)
Age25-30		-0.005 (0.032)		-0.008 (0.035)	-0.009 (0.035)		0.040 (0.041)	0.035 (0.041)
Age30+		0.026 (0.039)		0.028 (0.042)	0.027 (0.042)		0.083 (0.048)*	0.073 (0.048)
Year		-0.004 (0.003)		-0.004 (0.004)	0.008 (0.004)**		-0.007 (0.006)	-0.008 (0.006)
Part time					0.005 (0.027)		-0.008 (0.031)	0.004 (0.031)
UE major					-2.471 (0.327)***		-2.199 (0.352)***	-2.131 (0.358)***
Contacted Self					0.052 (0.043)		0.041 (0.047)	0.044 (0.048)
Offered Job					0.109 (0.041)***		0.118 (0.045)***	0.095 (0.045)**
Network					0.061 (0.036)*		0.074 (0.040)*	0.066 (0.040)*
Agency					-0.064 (0.040)		-0.058 (0.044)	-0.059 (0.044)
Other					-0.034 (0.060)		-0.089 (0.069)	-0.115 (0.070)
Constant	-0.486 (0.019)***	7.129 (5.880)	-0.481 (0.020)***	6.889 (7.396)	-16.939 (8.079)**	-0.502 (0.023)***	14.415 (11.392)	15.108 (11.543)
Industry dummies	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes
Obs.	13029	13029	11272	11272	11272	9197	9197	9197
Ps. R-square	0.001	0.008	0.001	0.009	0.014	0.001	0.016	0.020

Robust standard errors in parentheses.

Note: The table shows a full report of all estimates corresponding to those displayed in Table 6, Panel C.

Industry dummies refers to 18 industry dummies available in the 1999-2008 sample.

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table A8: Quantile Regression Estimates of the log of the Salary Request (corresponds to *Panel A, Table 7* in the paper)

	5th	10th	25th	50th	75th	90th	95th
Female	-0.016 (0.004)***	-0.015 (0.004)***	-0.016 (0.002)***	-0.023 (0.003)***	-0.031 (0.005)***	-0.046 (0.006)***	-0.063 (0.009)***
Law	0.016 (0.006)***	0.014 (0.005)***	0.013 (0.004)***	0.002 (0.003)	-0.014 (0.006)**	-0.023 (0.009)**	-0.028 (0.013)**
Comp. science	0.055 (0.009)***	0.056 (0.006)***	0.052 (0.006)***	0.042 (0.005)***	0.019 (0.006)***	-0.006 (0.008)	-0.032 (0.009)***
Manag/org	-0.004 (0.007)	-0.011 (0.007)*	-0.011 (0.005)**	-0.016 (0.003)***	-0.031 (0.005)***	-0.035 (0.009)***	-0.052 (0.010)***
Social science	-0.023 (0.007)***	-0.018 (0.005)***	-0.029 (0.003)***	-0.037 (0.003)***	-0.042 (0.007)***	-0.026 (0.006)***	-0.039 (0.013)***
Gov. sector	-0.008 (0.005)	-0.012 (0.005)**	-0.026 (0.004)***	-0.038 (0.003)***	-0.046 (0.005)***	-0.060 (0.007)***	-0.058 (0.012)***
Munic. sector	0.004 (0.008)	-0.000 (0.005)	-0.014 (0.005)***	-0.027 (0.004)***	-0.034 (0.007)***	-0.054 (0.008)***	-0.061 (0.012)***
Temporary	-0.015 (0.004)***	-0.017 (0.004)***	-0.014 (0.004)***	-0.018 (0.002)***	-0.023 (0.004)***	-0.038 (0.007)***	-0.043 (0.009)***
Age25-30	0.033 (0.007)***	0.032 (0.006)***	0.021 (0.004)***	0.021 (0.002)***	0.021 (0.004)***	0.017 (0.005)***	0.012 (0.011)
Age30+	0.048 (0.008)***	0.049 (0.005)***	0.040 (0.006)***	0.059 (0.005)***	0.078 (0.007)***	0.109 (0.008)***	0.123 (0.015)***
Year	0.028 (0.001)***	0.029 (0.001)***	0.030 (0.000)***	0.030 (0.000)***	0.027 (0.001)***	0.027 (0.001)***	0.030 (0.001)***
Part time	-0.036 (0.006)***	-0.030 (0.004)***	-0.028 (0.002)***	-0.024 (0.003)***	-0.022 (0.003)***	-0.021 (0.007)***	-0.025 (0.011)**
UE major	-0.069 (0.053)	-0.020 (0.054)	0.111 (0.049)**	0.315 (0.026)***	0.359 (0.041)***	0.188 (0.065)***	0.107 (0.080)
Contacted Self	-0.011 (0.008)	-0.004 (0.007)	-0.002 (0.004)	0.001 (0.004)	0.006 (0.007)	0.007 (0.007)	0.006 (0.011)
Offered Job	0.008 (0.010)	0.021 (0.005)***	0.016 (0.003)***	0.026 (0.005)***	0.037 (0.008)***	0.065 (0.013)***	0.083 (0.020)***
Network	-0.001 (0.006)	0.008 (0.005)*	0.006 (0.004)*	0.014 (0.004)***	0.021 (0.005)***	0.038 (0.010)***	0.040 (0.010)***
Agency	0.014 (0.006)**	0.014 (0.005)***	0.007 (0.003)**	0.004 (0.004)	0.001 (0.006)	0.002 (0.009)	0.001 (0.011)
Other	0.003 (0.007)	0.005 (0.008)	0.005 (0.006)	0.004 (0.006)	0.008 (0.007)	0.007 (0.010)	-0.015 (0.014)
Constant	-46.984 (1.675)***	-47.723 (1.106)***	-49.980 (0.919)***	-49.749 (0.935)***	-45.061 (1.189)***	-44.556 (1.994)***	-49.666 (2.474)***
Obs.	11457	11457	11457	11457	11457	11457	11457

Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses.

Note: The table shows a full report of all estimates corresponding to those displayed in Table 7, Panel A.

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table A9: Quantile Regression Estimates of the log of the Starting Salary (corresponds to *Panel B, Table 7* in the paper)

	5th	10th	25th	50th	75th	90th	95th
Female	-0.017 (0.005)***	-0.021 (0.004)***	-0.021 (0.004)***	-0.026 (0.003)***	-0.036 (0.005)***	-0.051 (0.006)***	-0.058 (0.010)***
Law	0.025 (0.004)***	0.023 (0.007)***	0.012 (0.006)**	0.001 (0.005)	-0.015 (0.006)***	-0.029 (0.011)***	-0.039 (0.014)***
Comp. science	0.065 (0.008)***	0.067 (0.006)***	0.064 (0.005)***	0.052 (0.005)***	0.028 (0.004)***	-0.002 (0.011)	-0.031 (0.011)***
Manag/org	0.007 (0.006)	0.001 (0.006)	-0.002 (0.005)	-0.017 (0.004)***	-0.029 (0.005)***	-0.040 (0.009)***	-0.056 (0.016)***
Social science	-0.003 (0.006)	-0.015 (0.005)***	-0.015 (0.005)***	-0.023 (0.003)***	-0.028 (0.004)***	-0.033 (0.011)***	-0.041 (0.016)***
Gov. sector	0.006 (0.004)	-0.006 (0.004)	-0.021 (0.003)***	-0.039 (0.003)***	-0.055 (0.006)***	-0.070 (0.009)***	-0.075 (0.010)***
Munic. sector	0.009 (0.007)	0.008 (0.007)	-0.005 (0.006)	-0.020 (0.003)***	-0.042 (0.005)***	-0.065 (0.009)***	-0.082 (0.014)***
Temporary	-0.010 (0.005)*	-0.012 (0.004)***	-0.020 (0.003)***	-0.025 (0.003)***	-0.028 (0.003)***	-0.036 (0.008)***	-0.050 (0.010)***
Age25-30	0.029 (0.006)***	0.031 (0.005)***	0.026 (0.004)***	0.023 (0.006)***	0.022 (0.004)***	0.024 (0.006)***	0.018 (0.013)
Age30+	0.046 (0.008)***	0.045 (0.006)***	0.042 (0.007)***	0.058 (0.006)***	0.077 (0.007)***	0.112 (0.009)***	0.122 (0.015)***
Year	0.030 (0.001)***	0.030 (0.001)***	0.030 (0.001)***	0.031 (0.000)***	0.030 (0.001)***	0.031 (0.001)***	0.033 (0.001)***
Part time	-0.032 (0.003)***	-0.028 (0.005)***	-0.029 (0.004)***	-0.025 (0.003)***	-0.026 (0.004)***	-0.024 (0.008)***	-0.025 (0.009)***
UE major	-0.287 (0.086)***	-0.162 (0.050)***	-0.068 (0.037)*	0.036 (0.035)	0.156 (0.048)***	0.114 (0.065)*	0.117 (0.085)
Contacted Self	-0.022 (0.008)**	-0.022 (0.006)***	-0.018 (0.006)***	-0.005 (0.005)	-0.002 (0.008)	-0.006 (0.009)	-0.004 (0.016)
Offered Job	0.003 (0.007)	0.007 (0.007)	0.008 (0.005)*	0.024 (0.005)***	0.034 (0.008)***	0.075 (0.012)***	0.079 (0.013)***
Network	0.000 (0.005)	-0.001 (0.004)	-0.002 (0.003)	0.008 (0.004)*	0.016 (0.004)***	0.027 (0.010)***	0.027 (0.011)**
Agency	0.007 (0.006)	0.010 (0.006)	0.003 (0.004)	0.010 (0.004)*	0.001 (0.006)	-0.000 (0.010)	-0.010 (0.009)
Other	0.012 (0.008)	0.011 (0.009)	0.004 (0.005)	-0.000 (0.008)	-0.004 (0.009)	-0.006 (0.010)	-0.009 (0.015)
Constant	-49.508 (1.346)***	-49.792 (1.269)***	-50.600 (1.135)***	-52.322 (0.721)***	-50.235 (1.013)***	-52.586 (1.932)***	-55.632 (1.552)***
Obs.	11457	11457	11457	11457	11457	11457	11457

Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses.

Note: The table shows a full report of all estimates corresponding to those displayed in Table 7, Panel B.

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table A10: Quantile Regression Estimates of the log of the Starting Salary conditional on the Salary Request (corresponds to *Panel C, Table 7* in the paper)

	5th	10th	25th	50th	75th	90th	95th
Female	-0.006 (0.004)	-0.006 (0.004)	-0.008 (0.002)***	-0.008 (0.001)**	0.000 (0.000)*	-0.007 (0.002)***	-0.007 (0.003)**
log Sal. Request	0.713 (0.022)***	0.766 (0.014)***	0.852 (0.009)***	0.900 (0.008)***	1.000 (0.000)***	0.947 (0.007)***	0.918 (0.008)***
Law	0.003 (0.006)	-0.003 (0.007)	0.002 (0.003)	0.003 (0.002)**	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.002)	-0.000 (0.006)
Comp. science	0.036 (0.006)***	0.027 (0.003)***	0.022 (0.004)***	0.011 (0.004)***	-0.000 (0.000)	0.005 (0.003)	0.005 (0.006)
Manag/org	0.010 (0.006)*	0.008 (0.005)	0.005 (0.003)*	0.004 (0.003)	0.000 (0.000)**	-0.002 (0.002)	-0.007 (0.006)
Social science	0.005 (0.006)	0.010 (0.005)*	0.013 (0.004)***	0.009 (0.003)***	0.000 (0.000)**	0.002 (0.003)	0.005 (0.006)
Gov. sector	0.015 (0.005)***	0.008 (0.004)**	-0.001 (0.003)	-0.013 (0.002)***	0.000 (0.000)***	-0.007 (0.003)**	-0.014 (0.004)***
Munic. sector	0.016 (0.008)*	0.012 (0.003)***	0.006 (0.003)*	-0.003 (0.003)	0.000 (0.000)**	-0.009 (0.003)***	-0.022 (0.004)***
Temporary	-0.004 (0.005)	-0.005 (0.003)*	-0.008 (0.002)***	-0.005 (0.002)**	0.000 (0.000)**	-0.005 (0.002)**	-0.013 (0.003)***
Age25-30	0.010 (0.006)	0.007 (0.004)*	0.004 (0.004)	0.003 (0.002)	-0.000 (0.000)**	0.006 (0.001)***	0.011 (0.004)**
Age30+	0.011 (0.007)*	0.012 (0.005)**	0.008 (0.004)*	0.005 (0.003)*	-0.000 (0.000)**	0.005 (0.002)**	0.011 (0.005)**
Year	0.009 (0.001)***	0.008 (0.001)***	0.006 (0.000)***	0.004 (0.000)***	-0.000 (0.000)**	0.003 (0.000)***	0.005 (0.000)***
Part time	-0.013 (0.005)**	-0.010 (0.002)***	-0.005 (0.001)***	-0.005 (0.001)***	0.000 (0.000)***	-0.005 (0.002)***	-0.009 (0.004)**
UE major	-0.304 (0.055)***	-0.234 (0.027)***	-0.263 (0.036)***	-0.200 (0.028)***	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.064 (0.024)***	-0.093 (0.051)*
Contacted Self	-0.033 (0.006)***	-0.019 (0.008)**	-0.009 (0.005)*	-0.008 (0.003)***	0.000 (0.000)	-0.016 (0.003)***	-0.024 (0.005)***
Offered Job	-0.002 (0.008)	0.002 (0.007)	0.006 (0.003)**	0.003 (0.002)	-0.000 (0.000)***	-0.011 (0.003)***	-0.012 (0.005)**
Network	-0.009 (0.007)	-0.004 (0.004)	-0.002 (0.003)	-0.002 (0.003)	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.012 (0.003)***	-0.016 (0.004)***
Agency	-0.004 (0.006)	0.002 (0.004)	0.000 (0.003)	0.001 (0.003)	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.001 (0.003)	-0.001 (0.005)
Other	0.011 (0.008)	0.005 (0.004)	0.004 (0.005)	-0.002 (0.004)	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.010 (0.005)*	-0.014 (0.006)**
Constant	-15.548 (1.659)***	-13.687 (1.427)***	-11.099 (0.710)***	-7.985 (0.678)***	0.000 (0.000)	-5.591 (0.680)***	-9.594 (0.958)***
Obs.	11457	11457	11457	11457	11457	11457	11457

Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses.

Note: The table shows a full report of all estimates corresponding to those displayed in Table 7, Panel C.

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table A11: Interquartile Regression Estimates of the Salary Request and Starting Salaries

	1999-2010				1999-2008			
	25-50th	50-75th	25-75th	05-95th	25-50th	50-75th	25-75th	05-95th
Female	-0.007 (0.003)***	-0.008 (0.004)**	-0.015 (0.004)***	-0.047 (0.011)***	-0.008 (0.003)***	-0.010 (0.004)**	-0.018 (0.005)***	-0.054 (0.013)***
Constant	0.231 (0.860)	4.688 (1.078)***	4.919 (1.366)***	-2.682 (2.770)	-0.339 (1.220)	6.278 (1.235)***	5.940 (1.675)***	7.406 (3.869)*
Controls99-12	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls99-10	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Industry dummies	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Obs.	11457	11457	11457	11457	9314	9314	9314	9314
Pseudo R-Square					0.25	0.20	0.20	0.19
Pseudo R-Square					0.25	0.25	0.25	0.21
	1999-2010				1999-2008			
	25-50th	50-75th	25-75th	05-95th	25-50th	50-75th	25-75th	05-95th
Female	-0.005 (0.003)*	-0.010 (0.004)**	-0.015 (0.004)***	-0.041 (0.012)***	-0.006 (0.004)	-0.011 (0.004)***	-0.017 (0.005)***	-0.035 (0.011)***
Constant	-1.722 (0.851)**	2.087 (1.078)*	0.365 (1.449)	-6.124 (2.589)**	-0.164 (1.258)	3.091 (1.364)**	2.927 (1.388)**	1.280 (4.088)
Controls99-12	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls99-10	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Industry dummies	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Obs.	11457	11457	11457	11457	9314	9314	9314	9314
Pseudo R-Square	0.25	0.21	0.21	0.19	0.22	0.20	0.20	0.19
Pseudo R-Square	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.22	0.21	0.22	0.21	0.20
	1999-2010				1999-2008			
	25-50th	50-90th	25-90th	05-95th	25-50th	50-90th	25-90th	05-95th
Female	0.000 (0.002)	0.002 (0.002)	0.002 (0.003)	-0.006 (0.006)	-0.000 (0.002)	0.001 (0.002)	0.000 (0.003)	-0.006 (0.006)
Constant	2.809 (0.696)***	3.043 (0.883)***	5.852 (1.008)***	6.291 (2.070)***	2.823 (0.914)***	3.514 (0.956)***	6.337 (1.305)***	8.919 (3.251)***
Controls99-12	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls99-10	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Industry dummies	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Obs.	11457	11457	11457	11457	9314	9314	9314	9314
Pseudo R-Square	0.62	0.67	0.67	0.66	0.60	0.67	0.67	0.67
Pseudo R-Square	0.52	0.62	0.56	0.43	0.52	0.60	0.52	0.41

Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses.

Note: A full report of all estimates is available upon request.

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table A12: Robustness Analysis: Summary Statistics for Work hours, Previous Experience, Tasks and Sub-field of Major

	Working/Negotiated		Working/Not Negotiated	
	Males (1)	Females (2)	Males (3)	Females (4)
<i>Work Hours per Week (1999-2010)</i>				
Less than 40 hours	0.30***	0.37	0.28***	0.37
41-45 hours	0.45	0.46	0.38***	0.41
46-50 hours	0.17***	0.13	0.20***	0.15
51+ hours	0.08***	0.04	0.14***	0.07
Observations	4 133	7 277	4 883	8 041
<i>Previous Experience (1999-2007)</i>				
No experience	0.43***	0.40	0.51***	0.46
Unqualified experience	0.31	0.33	0.27***	0.31
Qualified experience	0.26***	0.28	0.22	0.23
Observations	3 091	5 268		
<i>Tasks(1999-2005, 2007-2008)</i>				
Legal Work	0.11**	0.12	0.25***	0.28
Accounting	0.12***	0.15	0.07	0.08
Banking	0.05*	0.04	0.04	0.04
R and D	0.02	0.02	0.05**	0.04
Administration	0.05***	0.10	0.04***	0.09
Sales	0.008*	0.005	0.006	0.005
Taxation	0.02*	0.02	0.02*	0.03
PR and Info	0.04**	0.05	0.03**	0.04
Marketing	0.02*	0.02	0.02	0.02
Auditing	0.04	0.03	0.06	0.06
Human Resources	0.03***	0.05	0.03***	0.05
Project Management	0.05	0.05	0.04	0.04
Investigator	0.10*	0.12	0.09**	0.07
Education	0.04	0.04	0.03	0.03
System Operator	0.02*	0.02	0.3***	0.01
Programming	0.09***	0.03	0.05***	0.02
System Development	0.11***	0.04	0.06***	0.03
IT related	0.06***	0.04	0.03*	0.02
Other	0.04**	0.05	0.05	0.05
Observations	2520	4085	2782	4458
<i>Fields (1999-2008)</i>				
Marketing	0.11	0.11	0.08	0.08
Accounting	0.09**	0.10	0.11	0.12
Cost/Benefit	0.05***	0.03	0.04***	0.03
Organization	0.06	0.06	0.05	0.05
Finance	0.07***	0.04	0.07***	0.03
Public Economics	0.01**	0	0.004	0.003
Economics	0.05***	0.03	0.06***	0.03
Political Science	0.08	0.09	0.07	0.07
Economic Geography	0.01**	0.02	0.02*	0.02
Statistics	0.01	0.01	0.01**	0.006
Computer Science	0.21***	0.10	0.14***	0.07
Law	0.13***	0.15	0.26***	0.29
Sociology	0.02***	0.06	0.02***	0.04
Media	0.02***	0.05	0.02***	0.04
Pedagogics	0.02***	0.04	0.01***	0.02
Psychology	0.02***	0.06	0.02***	0.04
Language	0.01***	0.02	0.01***	0.02
Other	0.02**	0.02	0.01***	0.02
Observations	3 371	5 748	3 856	6 190

Note: * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$ in a t -test of a gender difference in mean values within each sample "Working/Negotiated" and "Working/Not Negotiated".

Source: Jusek surveys, 1999-2008.

Table A13: Robustness Analysis: Probit Regression Results for the Probability to State a Salary Request adding Working Hours, Experience, Task and Sub-field (corresponds to *Panel A, Table 8* in the paper)

	Overtime		Experience		Task		Field	
	Probit Negotiate	Probit Negotiate	Probit Negotiate	Probit Negotiate	Probit Negotiate	Probit Negotiate	Probit Negotiate	Probit Negotiate
Female	0.069 (0.020)***	0.056 (0.020)***	0.065 (0.021)***	0.061 (0.021)***	0.054 (0.024)**	0.042 (0.024)*	0.075 (0.020)***	0.074 (0.020)***
41-45 hours		0.106 (0.022)***						
46-50 hours		0.047 (0.030)						
51+ hours		-0.217 (0.040)***						
Unqual. Exp				0.145 (0.024)***				
Qual. Exp				0.256 (0.025)***				
Law	-0.120 (0.033)***	-0.118 (0.033)***	-0.132 (0.035)***	-0.130 (0.035)***	-0.125 (0.039)***	-0.096 (0.050)*	-0.129 (0.033)**	-0.126 (0.121)
Comp. science	0.153 (0.036)***	0.137 (0.036)***	0.143 (0.037)***	0.150 (0.037)***	0.152 (0.041)***	0.145 (0.054)***	0.174 (0.036)***	0.129 (0.098)
Manag/org	0.093 (0.035)***	0.085 (0.035)***	0.085 (0.037)**	0.090 (0.037)**	-0.020 (0.046)	0.046 (0.050)	0.077 (0.036)**	0.026 (0.078)
Social science	0.070 (0.030)**	0.061 (0.030)**	0.082 (0.032)***	0.079 (0.032)**	0.045 (0.036)	0.081 (0.039)**	0.078 (0.030)***	0.054 (0.065)
Temporary	-0.022 (0.021)	-0.025 (0.022)	-0.019 (0.022)	-0.034 (0.023)	0.011 (0.026)	0.014 (0.026)	-0.022 (0.022)	-0.026 (0.022)
Age25-30	0.188 (0.026)***	0.195 (0.026)***	0.170 (0.028)***	0.157 (0.028)***	0.184 (0.031)***	0.183 (0.031)***	0.189 (0.027)***	0.186 (0.027)***
Age30+	0.381 (0.033)***	0.387 (0.033)***	0.380 (0.034)***	0.363 (0.034)***	0.346 (0.039)***	0.346 (0.039)***	0.374 (0.033)**	0.373 (0.033)**
Year	-0.025 (0.004)***	-0.025 (0.004)***	-0.028 (0.005)***	-0.033 (0.005)***	-0.016 (0.004)***	-0.016 (0.005)***	-0.024 (0.004)***	-0.023 (0.004)***
Part time								
UE major	-2.108 (0.229)***	-2.027 (0.230)***	-2.042 (0.259)***	-2.017 (0.260)***	-2.139 (0.268)***	-1.997 (0.281)***	-2.283 (0.231)**	-2.337 (0.233)***
Contacted Self	-0.180 (0.032)***	-0.170 (0.032)***	-0.155 (0.033)***	-0.143 (0.033)***	-0.175 (0.038)***	-0.162 (0.039)***	-0.182 (0.032)***	-0.185 (0.032)***
Offered Job	-0.084 (0.032)***	-0.075 (0.032)***	-0.071 (0.033)**	-0.066 (0.034)**	-0.081 (0.039)**	-0.089 (0.039)**	-0.087 (0.032)***	-0.090 (0.032)***
Network	-0.116 (0.027)***	-0.114 (0.027)***	-0.110 (0.029)***	-0.102 (0.029)***	-0.097 (0.033)***	-0.097 (0.033)***	-0.121 (0.028)***	-0.123 (0.028)***
Agency	0.097 (0.032)***	0.097 (0.032)***	0.105 (0.033)***	0.102 (0.033)***	0.104 (0.037)**	0.068 (0.037)**	0.091 (0.032)***	0.086 (0.032)***
Other	-0.417 (0.040)***	-0.397 (0.040)***	-0.410 (0.042)***	-0.380 (0.043)	-0.394 (0.047)***	-0.370 (0.047)***	-0.425 (0.040)***	-0.424 (0.040)***
Constant	50.764 (7.654)***	50.117 (7.681)***	56.378 (9.766)***	65.884 (9.930)***	31.507 (8.652)**	32.600 (9.011)**	48.968 (7.700)**	45.874 (7.700)**
Task dummies	No	No	No	No	No	Yes	No	No
Sub-field dummies	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes
Industry dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Obs.	19340	19340	17693	17693	13831	13831	19155	19155
P.s. R-square	0.093	0.096	0.095	0.099	0.104	0.113	0.094	0.095

Robust standard errors in parentheses.
Note: The table shows a full report of all estimates corresponding to those displayed in Table 9, Panel A.
 Task dummies contain dummies for 19 different tasks.
 Field dummies contain dummies for 18 different sub fields.
 Industry dummies refers to 18 industry dummies available in the 1999-2008 sample.

** $p < 0.10$, *** $p < 0.05$, **** $p < 0.01$.

Table A14: Robustness Analysis: OLS Regression Results for the log of the Salary Request adding Working Hours, Experience, Task and Sub-field (corresponds to *Panel B*, *Table 8* in the paper)

	Overtime			Experience			Task			Field		
	log Salary Request	log Salary Request	log Salary Request	log Salary Request	log Salary Request	log Salary Request	log Salary Request	log Salary Request	log Salary Request	log Salary Request	log Salary Request	log Salary Request
Female	-0.025 (0.003)***	-0.021 (0.003)***	-0.026 (0.003)***	-0.027 (0.003)***	-0.023 (0.003)***	-0.025 (0.004)***	-0.023 (0.003)***	-0.026 (0.003)***	-0.023 (0.003)***	-0.023 (0.003)***	-0.023 (0.003)***	-0.023 (0.003)***
41-45 hours		0.013 (0.003)***										
46-50 hours		0.049 (0.005)***										
51+ hours		0.099 (0.009)***										
Unqual. Exp												
Qual. Exp				0.024 (0.003)***								
Law	-0.005 (0.005)	-0.005 (0.005)	-0.005 (0.005)	-0.004 (0.005)	-0.005 (0.005)	-0.005 (0.005)	-0.005 (0.005)	-0.005 (0.005)	-0.005 (0.005)	-0.005 (0.005)	-0.005 (0.005)	0.022 (0.015)
Comp. science	0.013 (0.005)***	0.020 (0.005)***	0.013 (0.005)***	0.014 (0.005)***	0.013 (0.005)***	0.024 (0.006)***	0.004 (0.008)	0.012 (0.005)***	0.009 (0.005)***	0.012 (0.005)***	0.012 (0.005)***	0.009 (0.013)
Manag/org	-0.024 (0.005)***	-0.022 (0.005)***	-0.024 (0.005)***	-0.023 (0.005)***	-0.024 (0.005)***	-0.034 (0.006)***	-0.046 (0.007)***	-0.024 (0.005)***	-0.006 (0.005)***	-0.024 (0.005)***	-0.024 (0.005)***	-0.006 (0.011)
Social science	-0.031 (0.005)***	-0.029 (0.004)***	-0.031 (0.004)***	-0.032 (0.005)***	-0.031 (0.005)***	-0.030 (0.005)***	-0.045 (0.006)***	-0.032 (0.005)***	-0.014 (0.005)***	-0.032 (0.005)***	-0.032 (0.005)***	-0.014 (0.011)
Temporary	-0.023 (0.003)***	-0.021 (0.003)***	-0.024 (0.003)***	-0.026 (0.003)***	-0.024 (0.003)***	-0.024 (0.003)***	-0.024 (0.003)***	-0.023 (0.003)***	-0.023 (0.003)***	-0.023 (0.003)***	-0.023 (0.003)***	-0.023 (0.003)***
Age25-30	0.042 (0.004)***	0.040 (0.004)***	0.041 (0.004)***	0.039 (0.004)***	0.041 (0.004)***	0.038 (0.004)***	0.036 (0.004)***	0.040 (0.004)***	0.037 (0.004)***	0.040 (0.004)***	0.040 (0.004)***	0.037 (0.004)***
Age30+	0.100 (0.005)***	0.098 (0.005)***	0.099 (0.005)***	0.097 (0.005)***	0.099 (0.005)***	0.095 (0.005)***	0.092 (0.005)***	0.100 (0.005)***	0.099 (0.005)***	0.100 (0.005)***	0.100 (0.005)***	0.099 (0.005)***
Year	0.030 (0.001)***	0.030 (0.001)***	0.030 (0.001)***	0.029 (0.001)***	0.030 (0.001)***	0.032 (0.001)***	0.032 (0.001)***	0.030 (0.001)***	0.030 (0.001)***	0.030 (0.001)***	0.030 (0.001)***	0.030 (0.001)***
Part time	-0.026 (0.003)***	-0.026 (0.003)***	-0.024 (0.003)***	-0.024 (0.003)***	-0.024 (0.003)***	-0.019 (0.003)***	-0.018 (0.003)***	-0.027 (0.003)***	-0.026 (0.003)***	-0.027 (0.003)***	-0.027 (0.003)***	-0.026 (0.003)***
UE major	0.185 (0.035)***	0.177 (0.035)***	0.199 (0.040)***	0.204 (0.040)***	0.199 (0.040)***	0.232 (0.040)***	0.282 (0.040)***	0.185 (0.035)***	0.179 (0.035)***	0.185 (0.035)***	0.185 (0.035)***	0.179 (0.035)***
Contacted Self	0.001 (0.005)	-0.001 (0.005)	-0.002 (0.005)	-0.000 (0.005)	-0.002 (0.005)	0.006 (0.005)	0.002 (0.005)	0.002 (0.005)	0.002 (0.005)	0.002 (0.005)	0.002 (0.005)	0.002 (0.005)
Offered Job	0.030 (0.005)***	0.025 (0.005)***	0.030 (0.005)***	0.031 (0.005)***	0.030 (0.005)***	0.036 (0.006)***	0.031 (0.006)***	0.030 (0.005)***	0.031 (0.005)***	0.030 (0.005)***	0.030 (0.005)***	0.031 (0.005)***
Network	0.013 (0.004)***	0.012 (0.004)***	0.014 (0.004)***	0.015 (0.004)***	0.014 (0.004)***	0.021 (0.005)***	0.017 (0.005)***	0.014 (0.004)***	0.013 (0.004)***	0.014 (0.004)***	0.013 (0.004)***	0.013 (0.004)***
Agency	0.003 (0.004)	0.004 (0.004)	0.002 (0.004)	0.002 (0.004)	0.002 (0.004)	0.001 (0.004)	-0.002 (0.004)	0.003 (0.004)	0.003 (0.004)	0.003 (0.004)	0.003 (0.004)	0.003 (0.004)
Other	0.005 (0.006)	0.003 (0.006)	0.004 (0.006)	0.010 (0.006)	0.004 (0.006)	0.007 (0.007)	0.001 (0.007)	0.005 (0.006)	0.003 (0.006)	0.005 (0.006)	0.005 (0.006)	0.003 (0.006)
Constant	-50.513 (1.116)***	-50.999 (1.116)***	-49.730 (1.481)***	-47.618 (1.482)***	-49.730 (1.481)***	-53.811 (1.270)***	-53.784 (1.270)***	-50.403 (1.136)***	-51.012 (1.159)***	-50.403 (1.136)***	-50.403 (1.136)***	-51.012 (1.159)***
Task dummies	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No
Field dummies	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No
Industry dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Obs.	9261	9261	8449	8449	8449	6605	6605	9128	9128	9128	9128	9128
R-square	0.359	0.375	0.328	0.340	0.328	0.406	0.428	0.360	0.360	0.360	0.360	0.372
Adj. R-Square	0.357	0.372	0.326	0.337	0.326	0.403	0.424	0.358	0.358	0.358	0.358	0.368

Robust standard errors in parentheses.
Note: The table shows a full report of all estimates corresponding to those displayed in Table 10, Panel B.
 Task dummies contain dummies for 19 different tasks.
 Field dummies contain dummies for 18 different sub fields.
 Industry dummies refers to 18 industry dummies available in the 1999-2008 sample.
 * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table A15: Robustness Analysis: OLS Regression Results for the log of the Starting Salary conditional on the Salary Request adding Working Hours, Experience, Task and Sub-field (corresponds to Panel C, Table 8 in the paper)

	Overtime		Experience		Task		Field	
	log Starting Salary	log Starting Salary	log Starting Salary	log Starting Salary	log Starting Salary	log Starting Salary	log Starting Salary	log Starting Salary
Female	-0.006 (0.002)***	-0.005 (0.002)***	-0.006 (0.002)***	-0.005 (0.002)***	-0.006 (0.002)***	-0.005 (0.002)***	-0.006 (0.002)***	-0.005 (0.002)***
41-45 hours		0.004 (0.002)**						
46-50 hours		0.006 (0.003)**						
51+ hours		0.016 (0.005)***						
Unqual. Exp								
Qual. Exp			0.008 (0.002)***					
log Sal. Request	0.873 (0.008)***	0.870 (0.008)***	0.872 (0.008)***	0.863 (0.010)***	0.870 (0.009)***	0.872 (0.008)***	0.871 (0.008)***	0.871 (0.008)***
Law	0.001 (0.003)	0.001 (0.003)	0.002 (0.003)	0.003 (0.003)	0.003 (0.003)	0.001 (0.003)	0.000 (0.009)	0.000 (0.009)
Comp. science	0.005 (0.003)*	0.006 (0.003)**	0.004 (0.003)*	0.005 (0.003)**	0.007 (0.003)**	0.005 (0.003)*	0.007 (0.008)	0.007 (0.008)
Manag/org	-0.001 (0.003)	-0.000 (0.003)	0.000 (0.003)	0.000 (0.003)	-0.004 (0.003)	-0.001 (0.003)	-0.003 (0.006)	-0.003 (0.006)
Social science	0.005 (0.002)**	0.005 (0.002)**	0.005 (0.003)*	0.005 (0.003)*	0.006 (0.003)**	0.006 (0.002)**	0.006 (0.005)	0.004 (0.005)
Temporary	-0.006 (0.002)***	-0.006 (0.002)***	-0.006 (0.002)***	-0.006 (0.002)***	-0.007 (0.002)***	-0.006 (0.002)***	-0.006 (0.002)***	-0.006 (0.002)***
Age25-30	0.008 (0.002)***	0.008 (0.002)***	0.009 (0.002)***	0.009 (0.002)***	0.007 (0.002)***	0.008 (0.002)***	0.008 (0.002)***	0.008 (0.002)***
Age30+	0.013 (0.003)***	0.013 (0.003)***	0.014 (0.003)***	0.014 (0.003)***	0.012 (0.003)***	0.013 (0.003)***	0.013 (0.003)***	0.013 (0.003)***
Year	0.004 (0.000)***	0.004 (0.000)***	0.003 (0.000)***	0.003 (0.000)***	0.005 (0.000)***	0.004 (0.000)***	0.004 (0.000)***	0.004 (0.000)***
Part time	-0.005 (0.002)***	-0.005 (0.002)***	-0.005 (0.002)***	-0.005 (0.002)***	-0.004 (0.002)**	-0.005 (0.002)***	-0.005 (0.002)***	-0.005 (0.002)***
UE major	-0.154 (0.020)***	-0.154 (0.020)***	-0.128 (0.023)***	-0.128 (0.023)***	-0.138 (0.024)***	-0.157 (0.020)***	-0.156 (0.020)***	-0.156 (0.020)***
Contacted Self	-0.011 (0.003)***	-0.011 (0.003)***	-0.011 (0.003)***	-0.011 (0.003)***	-0.012 (0.003)***	-0.011 (0.003)***	-0.011 (0.003)***	-0.011 (0.003)***
Offered Job	-0.001 (0.003)	-0.001 (0.003)	0.001 (0.003)	0.002 (0.003)	-0.003 (0.003)	-0.001 (0.003)	-0.001 (0.003)	-0.001 (0.003)
Network	-0.005 (0.002)**	-0.005 (0.002)**	-0.004 (0.002)**	-0.004 (0.002)**	-0.004 (0.003)	-0.005 (0.002)**	-0.005 (0.002)**	-0.005 (0.002)**
Agency	0.001 (0.002)	0.001 (0.002)	-0.000 (0.002)	-0.000 (0.002)	0.002 (0.003)	0.000 (0.002)	0.000 (0.002)	0.000 (0.002)
Other	-0.002 (0.003)	-0.002 (0.003)	-0.003 (0.004)	-0.003 (0.004)	-0.000 (0.004)	-0.002 (0.003)	-0.002 (0.003)	-0.002 (0.003)
Constant	-7.123 (0.753)***	-7.309 (0.754)***	-5.790 (0.923)***	-5.721 (0.939)***	-7.843 (0.884)***	-7.141 (0.754)***	-7.351 (0.776)***	-7.351 (0.776)***
Task dummies	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No
Field dummies	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No
Industry dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Obs.	9261	9261	8449	8449	6605	6605	9128	9128
R-square	0.808	0.808	0.800	0.801	0.824	0.825	0.809	0.809
Adj. R-Square	0.808	0.808	0.799	0.800	0.823	0.824	0.808	0.808

Robust standard errors in parentheses.
 Note: The table shows a full report of all estimates corresponding to those displayed in Table 9, Panel C.
 Task dummies contain dummies for 19 different tasks.
 Field dummies contain dummies for 18 different sub fields.
 Industry dummies refers to 18 industry dummies available in the 1999-2008 sample.
 * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table A16: Robustness Analysis: Probit Regression Results for probability to Obtain a Starting Salary that is lower than the Salary Request adding Working Hours, Experience, Task and Sub-field (corresponds to Panel A, Table 9 in the paper)

	Overtime		Experience		Task		Field	
	Probit Less	Probit Less	Probit Less	Probit Less	Probit Less	Probit Less	Probit Less	Probit Less
Female	0.062 (0.029)**	0.058 (0.029)**	0.067 (0.030)**	0.067 (0.030)**	0.057 (0.034)*	0.057 (0.029)**	0.054 (0.029)*	
41-45 hours	-0.007 (0.031)	-0.007 (0.031)						
46-50 hours	-0.032 (0.043)	-0.032 (0.043)						
51+ hours	-0.105 (0.063)*	-0.105 (0.063)*						
Unqual. Exp								
Qual. Exp								
Law	-0.004 (0.046)	-0.004 (0.046)	-0.027 (0.048)	-0.027 (0.048)	-0.005 (0.052)	-0.002 (0.046)	-0.069 (0.176)	
Comp. science	0.027 (0.048)	0.021 (0.048)	0.044 (0.050)	0.038 (0.050)	0.049 (0.054)	0.030 (0.049)	0.032 (0.132)	
Manag/org	0.070 (0.047)	0.068 (0.047)	0.065 (0.049)	0.064 (0.049)	0.156 (0.063)**	0.071 (0.047)	0.160 (0.108)	
Social science	-0.099 (0.042)**	-0.101 (0.042)**	-0.090 (0.045)**	-0.088 (0.045)**	-0.076 (0.049)	-0.098 (0.042)**	0.020 (0.094)	
Temporary	0.067 (0.029)**	0.064 (0.029)**	0.064 (0.031)**	0.071 (0.031)**	0.080 (0.035)**	0.067 (0.030)**	0.066 (0.030)**	
Age25-30	-0.060 (0.039)	-0.058 (0.039)	-0.086 (0.041)**	-0.084 (0.041)**	-0.078 (0.046)*	-0.062 (0.040)	-0.063 (0.040)	
Age30+	-0.034 (0.046)	-0.032 (0.046)	-0.053 (0.048)	-0.051 (0.048)	-0.033 (0.054)	-0.027 (0.055)	-0.039 (0.047)	
Year	0.002 (0.006)	0.002 (0.006)	0.014 (0.007)**	0.014 (0.007)**	-0.001 (0.006)	0.002 (0.006)	0.001 (0.006)	
Part time	0.019 (0.029)	0.019 (0.029)	0.028 (0.031)	0.027 (0.031)	0.029 (0.035)	0.023 (0.030)	0.026 (0.030)	
UE major	2.237 (0.338)**	2.246 (0.338)**	1.782 (0.384)**	1.823 (0.386)**	2.005 (0.399)**	2.204 (0.340)**	2.205 (0.343)**	
Contacted Self	0.077 (0.046)*	0.080 (0.046)*	0.075 (0.048)	0.071 (0.048)	0.141 (0.055)**	0.072 (0.046)	0.070 (0.046)	
Offered Job	0.043 (0.044)	0.048 (0.044)	0.023 (0.046)	0.021 (0.046)	0.067 (0.053)	0.056 (0.044)	0.058 (0.044)	
Network	0.031 (0.038)	0.032 (0.038)	0.018 (0.040)	0.018 (0.040)	0.069 (0.046)	0.037 (0.039)	0.036 (0.039)	
Agency	0.027 (0.042)	0.026 (0.042)	0.042 (0.044)	0.042 (0.044)	0.029 (0.049)	0.027 (0.042)	0.030 (0.042)	
Other	0.154 (0.066)**	0.157 (0.066)**	0.170 (0.069)**	0.152 (0.070)**	0.132 (0.075)*	0.159 (0.066)**	0.159 (0.066)**	
Constant	-3.844 (11.021)	-3.427 (11.027)	-28.307 (14.397)**	-27.657 (14.686)*	1.207 (12.450)	-4.042 (11.067)	-2.781 (11.379)	
Task dummies	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	
Field dummies	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	
Industry dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	
Obs.	9261	9261	8449	8449	6605	6605	9128	
P.s. R-square	0.022	0.022	0.022	0.023	0.023	0.026	0.023	

Robust standard errors in parentheses.
Note: The table shows a full report of all estimates corresponding to those displayed in Table 10, Panel A.
 Task dummies contain dummies for 19 different tasks.
 Field dummies contain dummies for 18 different sub fields.
 Industry dummies refers to 18 industry dummies available in the 1999-2008 sample.
 * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table A17: Robustness Analysis: Probit Regression Results for probability to Obtain a Starting Salary that is higher than the Salary Request adding Working Hours, Experience, Task and Sub-field (corresponds to *Panel B, Table 9* in the paper)

	Overtime		Experience		Task		Field	
	Probit More	Probit More	Probit More	Probit More	Probit More	Probit More	Probit More	Probit More
main								
Female	-0.074 (0.038)*	-0.068 (0.038)*	-0.078 (0.040)*	-0.079 (0.040)**	-0.064 (0.045)	0.059 (0.034)*	-0.072 (0.038)*	-0.075 (0.039)*
41-45 hours		0.025 (0.042)						
46-50 hours		0.057 (0.057)						
51+ hours		0.180 (0.082)**						
Unqual. Exp								
Qual. Exp				0.078 (0.045)*				
Law	0.050 (0.061)	0.043 (0.064)	0.043 (0.064)	0.042 (0.064)	0.035 (0.070)	0.023 (0.068)	0.045 (0.060)	-0.003 (0.244)
Comp. science	0.007 (0.064)	-0.014 (0.065)	-0.014 (0.067)	-0.009 (0.067)	0.027 (0.073)	0.103 (0.075)	0.013 (0.065)	0.152 (0.160)
Manag/org	-0.024 (0.065)	-0.020 (0.065)	-0.023 (0.068)	-0.021 (0.068)	-0.125 (0.089)	0.175 (0.069)**	-0.022 (0.065)	-0.047 (0.135)
Social science	0.042 (0.056)	0.046 (0.057)	0.039 (0.060)	0.038 (0.060)	0.081 (0.066)	-0.065 (0.053)	0.041 (0.057)	0.099 (0.119)
Temporary	-0.151 (0.040)***	-0.146 (0.040)***	-0.147 (0.043)***	-0.153 (0.043)***	-0.109 (0.049)**	0.072 (0.036)**	-0.134 (0.040)***	-0.134 (0.041)***
Age25-30	0.083 (0.054)	0.080 (0.054)	0.116 (0.057)**	0.115 (0.057)**	0.085 (0.064)	-0.074 (0.046)	0.086 (0.055)	0.084 (0.055)
Age30+	-0.049 (0.064)	-0.052 (0.064)	-0.018 (0.068)	-0.018 (0.068)	-0.051 (0.076)	-0.027 (0.055)	-0.041 (0.065)	-0.040 (0.065)
Year	0.013 (0.007)*	0.013 (0.007)*	0.002 (0.010)	0.002 (0.010)	0.015 (0.008)*	-0.001 (0.006)	0.011 (0.007)	0.011 (0.008)
Part time	-0.044 (0.040)	-0.044 (0.040)	-0.056 (0.042)	-0.056 (0.042)	-0.054 (0.048)	0.020 (0.035)	-0.049 (0.040)	-0.053 (0.040)
UE major	-0.763 (0.451)*	-0.778 (0.451)*	-0.421 (0.512)	-0.467 (0.515)	-0.867 (0.537)	1.930 (0.414)**	-0.857 (0.453)*	-0.869 (0.459)*
Contacted Self	-0.256 (0.066)***	-0.260 (0.066)***	-0.255 (0.069)***	-0.250 (0.069)***	-0.322 (0.081)***	0.133 (0.056)**	-0.251 (0.066)***	-0.248 (0.066)***
Offered Job	-0.321 (0.064)***	-0.330 (0.065)***	-0.302 (0.067)***	-0.300 (0.067)***	-0.363 (0.078)***	0.061 (0.053)	-0.329 (0.065)***	-0.336 (0.065)***
Network	-0.208 (0.053)***	-0.210 (0.053)***	-0.206 (0.055)***	-0.206 (0.055)***	-0.250 (0.063)***	0.068 (0.046)	-0.209 (0.053)***	-0.205 (0.053)***
Agency	0.040 (0.053)	0.042 (0.053)	0.041 (0.056)	0.041 (0.056)	0.065 (0.062)	0.025 (0.049)	0.040 (0.053)	0.042 (0.054)
Other	-0.102 (0.085)	-0.108 (0.085)	-0.119 (0.091)	-0.105 (0.091)	-0.137 (0.098)	0.131 (0.075)*	-0.111 (0.086)	-0.114 (0.086)
Constant	-26.240 (14.748)*	-26.892 (14.757)*	-4.346 (19.405)	-6.234 (19.758)	-31.883 (16.752)*	1.846 (12.998)	-22.957 (14.766)	-23.684 (15.181)
Task dummies	No	No	No	No	No	Yes	No	No
Field dummies	No	No	No	No	No	Yes	No	No
Industry dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Obs.	9248	9248	8436	8436	6595	6605	9116	9116
P.s. R-square	0.024	0.025	0.024	0.025	0.028	0.026	0.023	0.028

Robust standard errors in parentheses.
Note: The table shows a full report of all estimates corresponding to those displayed in Table 10, Panel B.
 Task dummies contain dummies for 19 different tasks.
 Field dummies contain dummies for 18 different sub fields.
 Industry dummies refers to 18 industry dummies available in the 1999-2008 sample.
 * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table A18: Robustness Analysis: Probit Regression Results for probability to Obtain a Starting Salary that is Equal to the Salary Request adding Working Hours, Experience, Task and Sub-field (corresponds to Panel C, Table 9 in the paper)

	Overtime		Experience		Task		Field	
	Probit Same	Probit Same	Probit Same	Probit Same	Probit Same	Probit Same	Probit Same	Probit Same
Female	-0.033 (0.030)	-0.031 (0.030)	-0.037 (0.031)	-0.037 (0.031)	-0.037 (0.035)	-0.037 (0.036)	-0.029 (0.030)	-0.027 (0.031)
41-45 hours								
46-50 hours								
51+ hours								
Unqual. Exp								
Qual. Exp					0.073 (0.035)**			
Law					0.060 (0.037)			
Comp. science					0.017 (0.051)			
Manag/org					-0.038 (0.052)			
Social science					-0.067 (0.052)			
Temporary					0.082 (0.047)*			
Age25-30					0.009 (0.032)			
Age30+					0.047 (0.043)			
Year					0.082 (0.050)			
Part time					-0.015 (0.008)**			
UE major					-0.002 (0.032)			
Contacted Self					-1.874 (0.408)**			
Offered Job					0.043 (0.050)			
Network					0.111 (0.048)**			
Agency					0.075 (0.042)*			
Other					-0.073 (0.044)			
Constant					-0.119 (0.070)			
Task dummies					29.832 (15.127)**			
Field dummies					No	No	No	No
Industry dummies					Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Obs.	9146	9146	8335	8335	6516	6516	9014	9014
P.s. R-square	0.021	0.021	0.021	0.022	0.019	0.022	0.020	0.021

Robust standard errors in parentheses.
 Note: The table shows a full report of all estimates corresponding to those displayed in Table 10, Panel C.
 Task dummies contain dummies for 19 different tasks.
 Field dummies contain dummies for 18 different sub fields.
 Industry dummies refers to 18 industry dummies available in the 1999-2008 sample.
 * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table A19: OLS Regression Results for the log of the Starting Salary *for those who did not State a Salary Request*

	1999-2012		1999-2010			1999-2008		
	log Starting Salary	log Starting Salary	log Starting Salary	log Starting Salary	log Starting Salary	log Starting Salary	log Starting Salary	log Starting Salary
Female	-0.044 (0.003)***	-0.040 (0.003)***	-0.043 (0.004)***	-0.040 (0.003)***	-0.036 (0.003)***	-0.041 (0.004)***	-0.032 (0.003)***	-0.030 (0.003)***
Law		-0.021 (0.004)***		-0.026 (0.004)***	-0.027 (0.004)***		-0.035 (0.004)***	-0.012 (0.006)**
Comp. science		0.018 (0.005)***		0.021 (0.006)***	0.034 (0.006)***		0.031 (0.006)***	0.014 (0.007)**
Manag/org		-0.034 (0.005)***		-0.025 (0.005)***	-0.019 (0.005)***		-0.021 (0.006)***	-0.026 (0.006)***
Social science		-0.036 (0.004)***		-0.037 (0.005)***	-0.025 (0.005)***		-0.024 (0.005)***	-0.036 (0.006)***
Gov. sector		-0.046 (0.003)***		-0.051 (0.003)***	-0.053 (0.003)***		-0.059 (0.004)***	
Munic. sector		-0.025 (0.005)***		-0.029 (0.005)***	-0.025 (0.005)***		-0.040 (0.006)***	-0.175 (0.127)
Temporary		-0.039 (0.003)***		-0.040 (0.003)***	-0.030 (0.003)***		-0.025 (0.004)***	-0.033 (0.004)***
Age25-30		0.022 (0.004)***		0.026 (0.004)***	0.023 (0.004)***		0.033 (0.004)***	0.031 (0.004)***
Age30+		0.016 (0.005)***		0.036 (0.005)***	0.037 (0.005)***		0.070 (0.006)***	0.065 (0.006)***
Year		0.027 (0.000)***		0.028 (0.000)***	0.029 (0.000)***		0.029 (0.001)***	0.030 (0.001)***
Part time					-0.059 (0.003)***		-0.059 (0.003)***	-0.059 (0.003)***
UE major					-0.124 (0.036)***		-0.149 (0.038)***	-0.074 (0.037)**
Contacted Self					-0.009 (0.005)**		-0.007 (0.005)	-0.017 (0.005)***
Offered Job					0.029 (0.005)***		0.033 (0.006)***	0.024 (0.006)***
Network					-0.003 (0.004)		-0.004 (0.005)	-0.012 (0.005)**
Agency					0.012 (0.005)**		0.020 (0.006)***	0.009 (0.006)
Other					0.038 (0.005)***		0.034 (0.005)***	0.027 (0.005)***
Constant	9.932 (0.003)***	-44.586 (0.676)***	9.901 (0.003)***	-45.342 (0.856)***	-47.402 (0.907)***	9.867 (0.003)***	-48.210 (1.179)***	-51.208 (1.151)***
Industry dummies	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes
Obs.	16044	16044	13052	13052	13052	10248	10248	10248
R-square	0.011	0.330	0.011	0.288	0.317	0.012	0.274	0.323
Adj. R-Square	0.011	0.329	0.011	0.287	0.316	0.012	0.273	0.320

Robust standard errors in parentheses.

Note: Industry dummies refers to 18 industry dummies available in the 1999-2008 sample.

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table A20: OLS Regressions of the Starting Salaries using an Interaction Term for Gender and the log of the Salary Request

	1999-2012		1999-2010			1999-2008		
	log Starting Salary	log Starting Salary	log Starting Salary	log Starting Salary	log Starting Salary	log Starting Salary	log Starting Salary	log Starting Salary
Female	-0.018 (0.090)	0.088 (0.091)	0.011 (0.098)	0.108 (0.099)	0.134 (0.098)	0.120 (0.114)	0.217 (0.114)*	0.223 (0.114)*
Fem*log Sal. Requesy	0.001 (0.009)	-0.009 (0.009)	-0.002 (0.010)	-0.012 (0.010)	-0.014 (0.010)	-0.013 (0.012)	-0.022 (0.011)*	-0.023 (0.011)**
log Sal. Request	0.935 (0.007)***	0.886 (0.008)***	0.934 (0.008)***	0.890 (0.009)***	0.892 (0.009)***	0.915 (0.009)***	0.890 (0.010)***	0.886 (0.010)***
Law		0.001 (0.002)		0.001 (0.002)		-0.001 (0.002)		0.001 (0.003)
Comp. science		0.009 (0.002)***		0.007 (0.002)***		0.013 (0.002)***		0.005 (0.003)**
Manag/org		-0.001 (0.002)		0.000 (0.002)		0.001 (0.002)		-0.001 (0.003)
Social science		-0.000 (0.002)		0.000 (0.002)		0.007 (0.002)***		0.005 (0.002)**
Gov. sector		-0.003 (0.002)*		-0.006 (0.002)***		-0.005 (0.002)***		-0.005 (0.002)***
Munic. sector		0.001 (0.002)		-0.002 (0.002)		-0.001 (0.002)		-0.002 (0.002)
Temporary		-0.008 (0.001)***		-0.009 (0.001)***		-0.006 (0.001)***		-0.006 (0.002)***
Age25-30		0.005 (0.002)***		0.005 (0.002)**		0.005 (0.002)**		0.009 (0.002)***
Age30+		0.005 (0.002)**		0.007 (0.002)***		0.008 (0.002)***		0.013 (0.003)***
Year		0.004 (0.000)***		0.004 (0.000)***		0.005 (0.000)***		0.004 (0.000)***
Part time						-0.006 (0.002)***		-0.005 (0.002)***
UE major						-0.196 (0.019)***		-0.153 (0.020)***
Contacted Self						-0.012 (0.002)***		-0.011 (0.003)***
Offered Job						0.001 (0.002)		-0.001 (0.003)
Network						-0.005 (0.002)**		-0.005 (0.002)**
Agency						0.000 (0.002)		0.000 (0.002)
Other						-0.001 (0.003)		-0.002 (0.003)
Constant	0.613 (0.073)***	-6.637 (0.443)***	0.620 (0.078)***	-6.927 (0.539)***	-9.020 (0.578)***	0.807 (0.087)***	-6.876 (0.741)***	-7.291 (0.753)***
Industry dummies	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes
Obs.	13394	13394	11457	11457	11457	9314	9314	9314
R-square	0.824	0.829	0.819	0.823	0.826	0.801	0.807	0.809
Adj. R-Square	0.824	0.829	0.819	0.823	0.826	0.801	0.806	0.808

Robust standard errors in parentheses.

Note: Industry dummies refers to 18 industry dummies available in the 1999-2008 sample.

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table A21: Quantile Regression Estimates of the Salary Request for 1999-2008

	1999-2008						
	5th	10th	25th	50th	75th	90th	95th
Female	-0.010 (0.006)	-0.007 (0.004)*	-0.012 (0.003)***	-0.020 (0.003)***	-0.030 (0.005)***	-0.043 (0.005)***	-0.064 (0.010)***
Constant	-51.147 (1.889)***	-51.769 (1.511)***	-54.491 (1.085)***	-54.830 (0.985)***	-48.551 (1.826)***	-41.582 (2.441)***	-43.741 (3.729)***
Controls99-12	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls99-10	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Industry dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Obs.	9314	9314	9314	9314	9314	9314	9314

Standard errors in parentheses.

Note: A full report of all estimates is available upon request

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table A22: Gender Gaps in the Probability to State a Salary Request Accounting for Starting Salary Levels, 1999-2012

	1999-2012						
	All			Males		Females	
	Probit <i>Negotiate</i>	Probit <i>Negotiate</i>	Probit <i>Negotiate</i>	Probit <i>Negotiate</i>	Probit <i>Negotiate</i>	Probit <i>Negotiate</i>	Probit <i>Negotiate</i>
Female	0.058 (0.016)***	0.120 (0.016)***	0.113 (0.016)***				
Starting Salary		0.626 (0.030)***		0.408 (0.037)***		0.879 (0.043)***	
Starting Salary Q(0-25)			2.903 (0.148)***		2.811 (0.251)***		2.978 (0.184)***
Starting Salary Q(25-50)			0.826 (0.177)***		0.738 (0.300)**		0.903 (0.220)***
Starting Salary Q(50-75)			1.367 (0.130)***		1.389 (0.209)***		1.291 (0.169)***
Starting Salary Q(75-100)			-0.151 (0.037)***		-0.214 (0.046)***		-0.034 (0.065)
Controls99-12	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Obs.	29182	29182	29083	10810	10772	18372	18311
Ps. R-square	0.033	0.058	0.076	0.051	0.076	0.068	0.077

Standard errors in parentheses.

Note: A full report of all estimates is available upon request.

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table A23: Gender Gaps in the Probability to State a Salary Request Accounting for Starting Salary Levels, 1999-2008

	1999-2008						
	All			Males		Females	
	Probit <i>Negotiate</i>	Probit <i>Negotiate</i>	Probit <i>Negotiate</i>	Probit <i>Negotiate</i>	Probit <i>Negotiate</i>	Probit <i>Negotiate</i>	Probit <i>Negotiate</i>
Female	0.120 (0.033)***	0.197 (0.033)***	0.182 (0.034)***				
Starting Salary		1.150 (0.069)***		0.748 (0.091)***		1.609 (0.098)***	
Starting Salary (Q2)			4.964 (0.286)***		4.888 (0.480)***		5.102 (0.359)***
Starting Salary (Q3)			1.196 (0.366)***		0.857 (0.601)		1.410 (0.465)***
Starting Salary (Q4)			1.288 (0.306)***		1.696 (0.468)***		0.975 (0.412)**
Starting Salary (Q5)			-0.579 (0.097)***		-0.702 (0.130)***		-0.382 (0.162)**
Controls99-12	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls99-10	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Industry dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Obs.	19526	19526	19448	7353	7325	12173	12123
Ps. R-square	0.093	0.114	0.128	0.110	0.132	0.125	0.130

Standard errors in parentheses.

Note: A full report of all estimates is available upon request.

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table A24: Robustness: Accounting for University, Recall and Job Qualification

	University		Recall		Qualified Task	
	Probit <i>Negotiate</i>	Probit <i>Negotiate</i>	Probit <i>Negotiate</i>	Probit <i>Negotiate</i>	Probit <i>Negotiate</i>	Probit <i>Negotiate</i>
Female	0.052 (0.028)	0.074 (0.031)*	0.082 (0.025)***	0.082 (0.025)**	0.047 (0.026)	0.074 (0.029)*
Constant	41.718 (15.130)**	40.196 (17.626)*	63.392 (20.290)**	64.308 (17.049)***	43.009 (15.284)**	64.966 (13.567)***
University dummies	No	Yes	No	No	No	No
Recall dummies	No	No	No	Yes	No	No
Qualified dummies	No	No	No	No	No	Yes
Controls99-10	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Industry dummies	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes
Obs.	19945	15393	19797	19797	20255	15705
	University		Recall		Qualified Task	
	log Salary Request	log Salary Request	log Salary Request	log Salary Request	log Salary Request	log Salary Request
Female	-0.033 (0.006)**	-0.027 (0.004)**	-0.026 (0.005)**	-0.027 (0.004)**	-0.033 (0.005)**	-0.027 (0.004)**
Constant	-47.595 (0.827)***	-52.834 (1.684)***	-48.166 (0.580)***	-51.653 (0.443)***	-51.101 (0.433)***	-52.826 (0.949)***
University dummies	No	Yes	No	No	No	No
Recall dummies	No	No	No	Yes	No	No
Qualified dummies	No	No	No	No	No	Yes
Controls99-10	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Industry dummies	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes
Obs.	9627	7647	9474	9474	9295	7315
	University		Recall		Qualified Task	
	log Starting Salary	log St. Salary	log St. Salary	log St. Salary	log St. Salary	log St. Salary
log Sal. Request	0.869 (0.018)***	0.858 (0.017)***	0.872 (0.016)***	0.871 (0.016)***	0.866 (0.013)***	0.853 (0.014)***
Female	-0.006 (0.003)*	-0.006 (0.002)*	-0.006 (0.002)**	-0.006 (0.002)**	-0.006 (0.003)*	-0.006 (0.002)*
Constant	-7.060 (0.617)***	-7.791 (0.537)***	-6.564 (0.539)***	-6.796 (0.458)***	-7.414 (0.644)***	-7.819 (0.653)***
University dummies	No	Yes	No	No	No	No
Recall dummies	No	No	No	Yes	No	No
Qualified dummies	No	No	No	No	No	Yes
Controls99-10	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Industry dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Obs.	7647	7647	9474	9474	7315	7315

Robust standard errors in parentheses.

Note: A full report of all estimates is available upon request.

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.